Analysis of spacecraft anomalies by Bloomquist, C. E. & Graham, W. C.
ANALYSIS OF SPACECRAFT ANOMALIES
By Charles E. B l o o m q u i s t and W i n i f r e d C. Graham
March 1976
PRC R-1833
{NASfi-CE-137654) ANALYSIS CF SPACECRAFT
ANOMALIES (EEC Systems Sciences Co., Los
Angeles) 145 p HC $6.00 CSCL 22E
N76-22271
Unclas
G3/13 27U04
Prepared u n d e r Contrac t No.
for
A M E S R E S E A R C H C E N T E R
N A T I O N A L A E R O N A U T I C S A N D SPACE A D M I N I S T R A T I O N
PRC SYSTEMS SCIENCES COMPANY
A Company of Planning Research Corporation
1100 GLENDON AVENUE • LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024 • [213) 473-1163
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19760015183 2020-03-22T15:11:10+00:00Z
FOREWORD
This document presents the results of a study to determine empirical-
ly, from an analysis of the PRC Space Data Bank, if there are problem areas
where in-space experimental or technological programs would contribute to
the prevention of spacecraft anomalies, and to define these programs.
The study was performed in the 4-month period beginning 11 November
1975 by PRC Systems Sciences Company for The Ames Research Center under
Contract NAS2-9041. Mr. F. F. DeMuth was the contract technical monitor.
ABSTRACT
The anomalies from 316 spacecraft covering the entire U.S. space
program were analyzed to determine if there were any experimental or
technological programs which could be implemented to remove the anomalies
from future space activity. Thirty specific categories of anomalies were
found to cover nearly 85 per cent of all observed anomalies. Thirteen
experiments were defined to deal with 17 of these categories; nine
additional experiments were identified to deal with other classes of
observed and anticipated anomalies.
Preliminary analyses indicate that all 22 experimental programs are
both technically feasible and economically viable.
OVERVIEW
The objective of the study described in this report was to deter-
mine empirically, from an analysis of the PRC Space Data Bank, if prob-
lem areas exist which could best be treated by in-space programs. These
programs would be such that their results would contribute to the preven-
tion of specific types of spacecraft anomalies or to the mitigation of
their effects. Program implementation would utilize the capabilities
of the Space Shuttle/Spacelab.
The PRC Space Data Bank, which provided the principal "input" to
the study, was compiled through a series of studies, and contains per-
formance information on 316 spacecraft from 43 U.S. space programs.
Over the time period covered by the PRC Space Data Bank (1960 to 1975),
these spacecraft have accumulated two million hours of on-orbit operation,
and over 1,600 separate anomalies have been recorded during their
operation.
In conducting the analysis for this study, two separate approaches
were applied: (1) an anomaly-by-anomaly evaluation of the data base
anomaly listings, and (2) a spacecraft-by-spacecraft evaluation of the
data base engineering reports. Approach 1 was not especially fruitful
in that very few single anomalies were found which could clearly be im-
pacted by an in-space program. Approach 2, on the other hand, proved
exceedingly fruitful.
This spacecraft-by-spacecraft evaluation revealed that a struc-
ture of 30 problem area categories clearly accommodates 50 percent of
the anomalies. The anomalies essentially grouped themselves into these
categories, and further, the classes of anomalies which constitute these
categories are remarkably persistent over the entire duration of the
U.S. space program.
Following the completion of the two types of evaluations, the
results of both were merged, then considered from the standpoint of
where in-space experimental programs appeared warranted. Twenty-two
such program areas were defined, and a number of others were identified
where ground-based programs appeared more promising.
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A brief economic feasibility analysis was then conducted. This
analysis, which was restricted to a level of detail sufficient for initial
decision-making purposes, was based on the number of anomalies that can
be expected on future spacecraft, and on varying efficiencies .of the recom-
mended experimental programs. The economic analysis indicated that the
programs would be cost-effective even at efficiencies as low as 10 percent.
IV
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The Space Shuttle/Spacelab will impact future unmanned space programs
in several ways. Its implementation will effectively prevent the loss of
payloads at launch, it will reduce the frequency of launch-induced anomalies,
and it will provide a means of correcting postlaunch anomalies of individual
spacecraft. The Space Shuttle/Spacelab will exert a significant influence
on the preluanch design, development, and test activities associated with
unmanned spacecraft or other payloads. It may also contribute to the reso-
lution of many previously observed spacecraft anomalies by providing the
capability to implement space-oriented experimental and technology programs
needed to resolve specific anomalies or problem areas.
The potential extent of this latter Space Shuttle/Spacelab impact is
investigated in the study reported herein. The other mentioned ways that
the Space Shuttle night influence unmanned space programs were investigated
in a previous study, the results of which are reported in Reference 1. Both
of these studies depend on an existing historical file of operational space-
craft reliability data referred to as the PRC Space Data Bank. This file
contains data on the actual performance of over 300 spacecraft of the U.S.
space program. Particular emphasis is given to the incidents of anomalistic
behavior recorded against these spacecraft.
The overall objective of the study is to establish an empirically-
based rationale for Space Shuttle/Spacelab service to future spacecraft
systems. This service takes the form of applied research, technology eval-
uation and experimental programs that require the capabilities of the
Space Shuttle/Spacelab for implementation. These programs are structured
so that their results can be used in the prevention of specific anomalies
and general problem areas in future spacecraft or at least to the mitigation
of their effects.
Section II of this report contains a brief description of the PRC
Space Data Bank; the limited extension of the data bank that was under-
taken in this study is also discussed. The total data base includes in-
formation on the reliability of 316 spacecraft from 43 programs. These
spacecraft have accumulated over two million hours of on-orbit operation
and over 1600 individual anomalies have been recorded during their oper-
ation. Information from six spacecraft (five programs) involving over
100,000 hours of spacecraft operation and 173 anomalies were added to the
data bank during this study. A detailed compilation of the added data
is presented in Appendix A.
Section III presents the analyses of the PRC Space Data Bank per-
formed during this study. Each spacecraft anomaly was reevaluated using
all available information and coded using two different approaches. In
the first approach, each anomaly was considered individually and a judg-
ment made as to whether there was a potential experimental or technology
program, to be conducted in space, that could be used to prevent the
anomaly or mitigate its effect in future space activities. For approxi-
mately 100 anomalies (6 percent), a positive judgment was made. The
other anomalies were further separated into those for which such a pro-
gram was judged to be unwarranted (39 percent) and those for which no
determination could be made (55 percent). A more detailed assessment
of the 100 anomalies reduced the number to 69 which could be treated
by 18 experimental and technology evaluation programs.
In the second approach, thirty problem areas were refined from the
data bank. These problem areas included over eighty percent of the anomalies
analyzed. For this reason and because of the persistence of these problem
areas over time, each was evaluated as to its potential for being resolved
by an experimental or technology program conducted from the Space Shuttle.
It was judged that seventeen of the thirty problem areas (covering about
50 percent of all anomalies) would benefit significantly from such a pro-
gram.
Section IV identifies and outlines the main features of the proposed
experimental and technology programs. Twenty-two programs are presented.
Thirteen of these deal with the seventeen problem areas determined to be
amenable to an in-space applied research program. Nine other experiments
are proposed to deal with specific anomalies or particular facets of cer-
tain problem areas (such as lubrication, semiconductors, and radiation)
or with equipments which have a special requirement for the space environment
(these include gravity gradient stabilization systems and heat pipes).
A crude economic evaluation of the twenty-two programs is presented
in Section V. The factors involved in the evaluation are delineated and
their treatment to arrive at a decision in each case is explained. All
twenty-two programs are judged to be economically viable although some
are more clearly viable than others.
Section VI contains the conclusions of the study and recommendations
for further work. The study indicates that there are several persistent
problem areas that could be removed from future spacecraft by application
of the results of defined Space Shuttle system experimental and technology
evaluation programs. These programs appear to be technically and econom-
ically feasible. It is recommended that additional data on past programs
be assembled, that new lines of investigation opened up by the current
study be pursued, and that the role of spacecraft reliability in the Shuttle
era be analyzed using the observed experience of the data bank, projected
missions, and considerations of the economic impact of differing levels of
required reliability.
II. SPACE DATA BANK UPDATE
A. General Background
PRC has compiled, through a series of studies, considerable informa-
tion regarding the on-orbit reliability of U.S. spacecraft. This inform-
ation is referred to collectively as the PRC Space Data Bank. It consists
of the following:
o The published reports and papers describing data bank studies
and results.
p An unpublished file of engineering analysis reports (EARs), one
for each spacecraft represented in the published portion of the
data bank.
o An organized collection of study notes, related reports, articles,
clippings, bibliographies, and interview records.
The published portion of the data bank now includes information on
the reliability of 316 spacecraft from 43 programs. These spacecraft have
accumulated 2 million hours of on-orbit operation, and over 1,600 separ-
ate anomalies have been recorded during their operation. The published
reports and papers do not correlate specific anomalies with particular
spacecraft; the EARs do.
The EARs are the basic data collection. They contain:
o General descriptive and operational data on each spacecraft.
o A detailed breakdown of the spacecraft assemblies, components,
and piece-parts.
o Operating (and dormant) time accumulated by each hardware
element.
o Descriptions of all anomalies and failures recorded against
the spacecraft,'together with information on the known or
probable causes of many anomalies.
o Background information regarding manufacture, test, and launch.
The information contained in each EAR, as summarized above, is organ-
ized into 3 categories, namely, (1) general information, (2) reliability
data, and (3) development and prelaunch information. General information
includes launch date, launch vehicle, launch site, intended mission, orbi-
tal parameters, spacecraft description, and a general performance assess-
ment over the time period covered by the PRC.Space Data Bank.
See references 1 through 13.
The reliability data elements, to the extent possible, break the
spacecraft down into its major components (receivers, tape recorders,
digital decoders, etc.)f accumulate the survival hours in space for each,
including length of time on standby and number of times cycled, list in
a further breakdown the piece-parts in each component, and finally, pro-
vide a rather detailed description of each anomaly (failure or other non-
nominal mission behavior) recorded during the mission.
Development and prelaunch information includes, as available, the
prelaunch test and checkout routines and experience, and thumbnail descrip-
tions of developmental testing, part selection procedures, and quality
assurance provisions.
The PRC Space Data Bank has been built up through a variety of spons-
ors and study objectives, and was accumulated in four stages. The
first stage provided data through 1970. In the second stage, access to
military program data was considerably reduced, also no data were active-
ly sought for spacecraft with nominally short mission durations. The
data quality in the second stage was greatly improved over that in the
first stage for both NASA and the unrestricted military programs. The
third and fourth stages were limited additions to the PRC Space Data Bank.
Typical of the 43 programs included in the PRC Space Data Bank are
the Army-sponsored SECOR program with 14 spacecraft, the Navy SOLRAD
program with 3 spacecraft, the Air Force Vela program with 10 spacecraft,
and the NASA Gemini, Mariner, Nimbus, OGO, ATS, and Pioneer programs. In
terms of chronology, the data base extends from Vanguard the first U.S.
satellite to, with the update discussed below, a spacecraft launched
as recently as May, 1974.
B. update For This Study
While the published PRC Space Data Bank was considered to be adequate
for purposes of this study, the desirability of extending the data base
to include anomalies of a more recent vintage was also manifest. Therefore,
data received too late for inclusion in the last published update were
analyzed and included as part of the data base for this study. Since
Sponsors include the General Electric Company (Apollo Support Department),
the Navy Space Systems Activity, NASA headquarters, and Marshall Space Flight
Center, In addition, substantial quantities of data were supplied without
benefit of contract to the Goddard Space Flight Center, the General Account-
ing Office, and General Electric Company (Viking Project Support Services).
these data were so sparse, however, it was also decided to include readily
available data from programs with established contacts and a record of
cooperation. The overall results of this data base update are summarized
in Exhibit II-l.
The information on SOLRAD 10 was chiefly that received too late for
the last update, although specific anomaly data was obtained from the
program office for this study. Practically all of the other update inform-
ation, i.e., that for ATS-6, Landsat-1, Mariner 10, and Pioneers 10 and
11, was obtained during this study.
Since such large quantities of data were found to be available,
and were received, some restrictions were necessary in order to deal effect-
ively with them on this study. Hence, it was decided to analyze only
anomaly data and the general descriptive and operational information
on each of the 6 spacecraft included in the update. In other words,
operating times, hardware breakdowns and configurations, and information
on prelaunch activities were not considered. While these would be of
interest in data bank analyses similar to those conducted in the past,
they are not especially pertinent to the anomaly evaluation required on
this study.
In this rather restricted update effort, 173 anomalies were found
which, interestingly enough, do not appear to be significantly different
from a random sample of anomalies from the previously published PRC
Space Data Bank. Some anomalies that occurred as recently as the last
quarter of 1975, for instance, bear a striking resemblance to some of
those occurring in the early 1960's. Thus, in addition to increasing the
anomaly data base by over 10%, the 173 anomalies added during this up-
date indicate that the entire data base appears to be relatively homogeneous.
Appendix A contains the PRC Space Data Bank update for this study.
EXHIBIT II-l: SPACECRAFT INCLUDED IN UPDATE FOR THIS STUDY
SPACECRAFT LAUNCH DATE ORBITAL HOURS ANOMALIES
ATS-6
LANDSAT-1
MARINER 10
PIONEER 10
PIONEER 11
SOLRAD
May 1974
July 1972
November 1973
July 1972
April 1973
July 1971
13,000
26,000
12,000
30,000
24,000
3,000
52
41
41
14
23
2
108,000 173
III. ANALYSIS
A. Analysis Overview
The objective of the analysis conducted during this study was es-
sentially the same as the overall study objective. This was to deter-
mine empirically, from an analysis of the PRC Space Data Bank, if problem
areas exist which could best be treated by in-space programs. These pro-
grams would be such that their results would contribute to the prevention
of specific types of spacecraft anomalies or to the mitigation of their
effects. Program implementation would utilize the capabilities of the
Space Shuttle/Spacelab.
In conducting the analysis, two separate approaches were applied: (1)
an anomaly-by-anomaly evaluation of the data base, and (2) a spacecraft-
by-spacecraft evaluation of the EAR's. Approach 1 was not especially fruit-
ful in that very few single anomalies were found which could clearly be
impacted by an in-space program. In other words, very few anomalies,
when considered individually, cry-out "fix me." Approach 2, on the other
hand, proved exceedingly fruitful.
This spacecraft-by-spacecraft evaluation revealed that a structure
of 30 problem area categories clearly accommodates a large percentage of
the anomalies. The anomalies essentially grouped themselves into these
categories, and further, the classes of anomalies which constitute these
categories are remarkably persistent over the entire duration of the U.S.
space program.
Following the completion of the two types of evaluations, the re-
sults of both were merged, then considered from the standpoint of where
in-space experimental programs appeared warranted. Twenty-two such pro-
gram areas were defined, and a number of others were identified where
ground-based programs appeared more promising.
In addition to the PRC Space Data Bank, two other principal types
of "input" were utilized throughout the analysis. These can be summarized
as follows: (1) the capabilities of the Space Shuttle System to accom-
modate payloads and the definition of the interfaces between payloads and
the Space Shuttle System taken from the Johnson Space Center publication
JSC 07700, Volume XIV, Revision D, 26 November 1975, and (2) direction
provided by the Ames Research Center and supplementary information con-
sisting of attendance at the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology
Workshop Report to Universities, Industry and Other Government Agencies,
as well as published literature on research applicable to on-orbit
spacecraft reliability improvement.
In the following subsections, the various aspects of the analysis
and its results are described in more detail. In addition, some obser-
vations made during the analysis, which are not especially related to the
purposes of this study but may nevertheless be of interest, are presented.
B. Approach 1
As indicated above, Approach 1 consisted of examining the PRC Space
Data Bank, including the update completed during this study, anomaly-by-
anomaly. Each anomaly was considered in terms of its context of occur-
rence and the specific objectives of this study, and each was assigned
to one of three categories. These categories were defined to reflect the
reasonableness of eliminating a particular type of anomaly in the future
by conduting an experimental or technology program based on Shuttle sys-
tem capabilities. These three categories, then, are as follows:
o Potential shuttle utilization
o Not reasonable to utilize shuttle
o Unable to determine
Typical anomalies assigned to the "potential Shuttle utilization"
category include those caused by unpredictable space-environmental effects
which could conceivably be better understood through in-space programs.
Also included are anomalies stemming from hardware requirements that can-
.not be adequately evaluated under simulated conditions.
Typical anomalies assigned to the "not reasonable to utilize shuttle"
category include all launch-induced problems as well as those related to
early postlaunch events. The rationale here was that implementation of
the Space Shuttle/Spacelab will effectively prevent the loss of payloads
at launch, will reduce the frequency of launch-induced anomalies, and
10
will provide a means of correcting postlaunch anomalies of individual
spacecraft.
The "unable to determine" category is self-explanatory. Typical
anomalies assigned to it include those due to unknown causes and those
where little information is available.
Of the 1,613 PRC Space Data Bank anomalies, 100, or just, over 6
percent, were judged to be potentially amenable to treatment by a Space
Shuttle System experimental or technology program. Since this is a
rather trivial number, all anomaly assignments were further partitioned
to see if any trends with calender time would be evident. Exhibit III-l
presents the results of both this partitioning as well as the assignments
of the three overall categories. From the distributions shown in this
exhibit, it can be seen that no trends with calender time are evident.
C. Approach 2
As.indicated above, Approach 2 consisted of a spacecraft-by-
spacecraft examination of the PRC Space Data Bank EAR's. Since the
specific objectives of previous data base studies had never required such
an examination, this is the first time that the anomalies have been
analyzed on this basis. The fundamental aim of this analysis was to
seek out any trends in anomaly occurrances which would indicate problem
areas. It was initially felt that if such trends, and their associated
problem areas, existed, they would become evident by systematic evalua-
tions that considered such factors as type of spacecraft (e.g., 3-axis
stabilized versus spin stabilized), the state-of-the-art during space-
craft development, similarity of anomalies experienced by the individual
spacecraft within a program, and spacecraft complexity.
This initial premise, i.e., that there are trends in anomaly oc-
currences which indicate problem areas, was substantiated quite early in
the Approach 2 analysis. In addition, two divergent lines of possible
investigations became apparent. One of these lines, involving a syste-
matic characterization of anomaly occurrences, was not pursued since it
is not applicable to the study objective of defining in-space programs
for preventing anomalies. It did result, however, in the observations
reported in subsection III-F below. The other possible line of
11
EXHIBIT III-l - CATALOG OF ANOMALY ASSIGNMENTS, APPROACH 1
SHUTTLE UTILIZATION CATEGORIES (PERCENT)
DATA BASE
PARTITION
S1965
1966-1970
1971
21972
NUMBER OF
ANOMALIES .
692
538
210
173
NUMBER OF
SPACECRAFT
225
79
6
6
POTENTIAL
4.5
9.5
3.3
6.1
NOT
REASONABLE
41.9
35.3
36.2
38.9
UNABLE TO
DETERMINE
53.6
55.2
60.5
55.0
TOTAL 1613 316 6.2 38.6 55.2
investigation that became apparent deals with the clustering and persis-
tence of certain problem areas.
When the anomalies were considered as described above, and also
with a view to applying a space experimental or technology program to
prevent future occurrences, they essentially grouped themselves into 30
categories. Two significant aspects are apparent from this: (1) the
tightness of the clustering of anomalies, i.e., their similarity, and
(2) the persistence of the anomalies from the earliest days of the
space program to the present.. This is illustrated by the fact that the
30 categories easily accommodate a large percentage of the data base
anomalies.
During this Approach 2 analysis, approximately 1,000 anomalies
were considered. Unsuccessful launches, anomalies from the manned space
programs (Mercury and Gemini) and anomalies from the Agena program,
which together total about 600 data base anomalies, were not specifically
considered. The anomalies occurring on both the manned space programs
and the Agena program are, in general, unique to the special requirements
of those programs and therefore not especially pertinent to this study.
These anomalies were, however, briefly surveyed and entered into the
deliberations leading to the definition of candidate experimental or
technology programs.
Of the approximately 1,000 anomalies considered, then, well over
80 percent fall into the 30 categories of leading problem areas. The re-
maining 15 or 16 percent of the anomalies are quite widely scattered.
These leading problem areas are listed in Exhibit III-2.
Most of the anomalies were rather clearly associated with specific
types of hardware items. These 16 categories are listed in the left
column of Exhibit III-2. The middle column lists functions experiencing
anomalous behavior which are rather difficult to tie to a specific piece
of hardware. The right column lists three particularly common and wide-
spread anomalies.
The rank order, by percentage, of these 30 problem area categor-
ies is shown in Exhibit III-3. Since approximately 1,000 anomalies, and
also 150 spacecraft, are represented in the exhibit, the 12.3 percent of
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EXHIBIT III-2 - LEADING PROBLEM AREAS
EQUIPMENT
BATTERIES
CAMERA EQUIPMENT
DEPLOYABLE STRUCTURES
GYROSCOPES
HORIZON SCANNERS
REACTION WHEELS
SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS
SOLAR ARRAYS
(EXCEPT DEGRADATION)
SOLAR ARRAY DRIVES
STAR TRACKERS
SUM SENSORS
TAPE RECORDERS
WIDE-BAND RECEIVERS
WIDE-BAND TRANSMITTERS
WIDE-BAND TRANSPONDERS
WIDE-BAWD, OTHER
FUNCTIONS
COMMAND & CONTROL
(TIMERS, SEQUENCERS)
COMMAND & CONTROL
(LOGIC)
COMMAND & CONTROL
(REGISTERS, MEMORIES)
COMMAND, RF-LOCK ON
COMMAND, RF-OTHER
POWER CONDITIONING .
PROPULSION (CHEMICAL)
TELEMETRY ENCODING
TELEMETRY, RF
TELEMETRY SENSING
THERMAL CONTROL
OTHER
RFI/EMI
SOLAR ARRAY DEGRADATION
SPURIOUS COMMANDS
EXHIBIT III-3 - RANK ORDER OF PROBLEM AREAS
AREA
SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS
TAPE RECORDERS
CAMERA EQUIPMENT
BATTERIES
RFI/EMI
COMMAND & CONTROL-LOGIC
POWER CONDITIONING
TELEMETRY-RF
SPURIOUS COMMANDS
STAR TRACKERS
TELEMETRY ENCODING
WIDE-BAND TRANSMITTERS
COMMAND & CONTROL-TIMERS
PROPULSION (CHEMICAL)
SUN SENSORS
PERCENTAGE
12.3
10.0
7.3
5.5
5.3
4.6
4.5
4.3
4.1
3.7
3.5
2.9
2.8
2.8
2.7
AREA
TELEMETRY SENSING
COMMAND, RF-LOCK-ON
COMMAND & CONTROL-MEMORIES
REACTION WHEELS
WIDE-BAND, OTHER(1)
COMMAND, RF-OTHER(2)
THERMAL CONTROL
HORIZON SENSORS
SOLAR ARRAYS
DEPLOYABLE STRUCTURES
GYROSCOPES
SOLAR ARRAY DEGRADATION
SOLAR ARRAY DRIVES
WIDE-BAND RECEIVERS
WIDE-BAND TRANSPONDERS
PERCENTAGE
2.7
2.5
2.5
2.3
2.2
1.7
1.7
1.5
1.4
1.4
1.1
1.1
1.1
0.3
0.2
NOTES: (1) Other than wide-band receivers, transmitters, and transponders.
(2) Other than command, RF-lock-on.
anomalies assigned to Scientific Instruments represents approximately
123 anomalies occurring in this category; furthermore, these 123 anomalies
were observed on 150 spacecraft. The first five categories account for
over 40 percent of the anomalies considered in the Approach 2 analysis,
and over 1/3 of all anomalies including those unassigned to the 30
categories.
The persistence of the anomalies, as indicated above, was noted
by the fact that anomalies occurring on the more recently launched space-
craft are the same types as those on earlier spacecraft. In other words,
even though advances in the state-of-the-art have occurred, they have not
resulted in "new" or different types of anomalies. Exhibit III-4 depicts
the occurrence of anomalies as a function of the year of spacecraft launch
for five typical problem area categories. The persistence of anomalies
in these categories, as in the other categories defined during the anal-
ysis, can be seen from this exhibit.
D. Merging the Results of the Two Approaches
After completing the analyses of Approaches 1 and 2, their results
were evaluated in order to define experimental programs that could alle-
viate the observed problem areas. The general ground rules that were
established for this experiment definition or selection process are as
follows:
o Potential for eliminating large numbers of anomalies
o Requires the space environment for effective
completion
o High probability of useful results
o Contribution to extended on-orbit life
A problem area was more likely to be selected as a candidate experiment
as more of the ground rules were satisfied. However, some experiments
were defined which are felt to be important even though they satisfy
only one of the established ground rules.
For many high ranked problem area categories, a space conducted
program was not considered to be worthwhile. These areas are listed in
Exhibit III-5. The primary reason for failing to propose experimental
16
EXHIBIT III-4 - ANOMALY OCCURRENCE BY YEAR OF LAUNCH
BATTERIES
CAMERA EQUIPMENT
STAR TRACKERS
SUN SENSORS
TAPE RECORDERS
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74
EXHIBIT III-5 - ANOMALY CATEGORIES FOR WHICH HO EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAMS ARE PROPOSED
DEPLOYABLE STRUCTURES
GYROSCOPES
POWER CONDITIONING
PROPULSION (CHEMICAL)
SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS
SOLAR ARRAY DRIVES
TELEMTRY ENCODING
TELEMETRY-RP
TELEMETRY SENSING
WIDE-BAND RECEIVERS"
WIDE-BAND TRANSMITTERS
WIDE-BAWD TRANSPONDERS
WIDE-BAND, OTHER
programs in these areas is that it seems highly preferable to undertake
programs utilizing only ground-based equipment and facilities first. A
secondary reason is that many of these problems are highly design related
and do not lend themselves to a common solution. Complete rationales are
given in subsection III-E below on all these anomaly categories for
which no in-space experimental programs are recommended.
For the other anomaly groups, or problem areas, identified through
Approaches 1 and 2, 22 experimental programs were defined. Some of these
deal with more than one problem area, or in other words, "merged" problem
areas. All are considered to be technically feasible, all would con-
tribute to the reliability of future spacecraft, and all require the space
environment for successful conclusion. Generally, the recommended pro-
grams are a kind of space qualification which should provide the informa-
tion necessary to upgrade specific equipment or function reliability.
These 22 recommended experimental areas, together with the number
of observed anomalies covered by each, are listed in Exhibit III-6. Ap-
proximately 50 percent of all anomalies are impacted by these recommended
programs. Section TV discusses each of these programs, including the ra-
tionales for their recommendation.
E. Problem Areas for Which No In-Space Program is Recommended
Of the 30 problem area categories defined through Approach 2 of the
analysis, 13 do not appear to warrant an in-space experimental program.
One of these, scientific instrument packages, while the highest ranking
problem area, can be dismissed immediately. The types of equipment repre-
sented by this category cover a wide range, e.g., electron traps, spec-
trometers, and scintillation counters, and the hardware is often designed
and built by universities on grant funds. Therefore, there does not ap-
pear to be a common solution for anomalies in this category. The remain-
ing 12 problem area categories 'from Approach 2 as well as some anomaly
groups identified in Approach 1 are discussed in the following 11
subsections.
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EXHIBIT III-6 - RECOMMENDED EXPERIMENTAL AREAS
N)
O
EXPERIMENT
ANTENNAS
ARRAY DEGRADATION
BATTERIES
CAMERA EQUIPMENT
COMPUTERS
DAY/NIGHT EFFECTS
EARTH EFFECTS
GRAVITY GRADIENT
HEAT PIPES
HORIZON SCANNERS
ION ENGINES
NUMBER OF
ANOMALIES
14
23
52
69
93
9
5
13
1
14
3
EXPERIMENT
LUBRICANTS
NUCLEAR POWER SUPPLIES
RADIATION
REACTION WHEELS
RFI/EMI
SEMICONDUCTORS
STAR TRACKERS
SUN SENSORS
TAPE RECORDERS
THERMAL CONTROL
UPLINK PROBLEMS
NUMBER OF
ANOMALIES
6
1
8
22
50
10
35
25
94
16
39
1. Deployable Structures
PRC originally felt that this might be an area where direct
observations in the 0-g environment would prove beneficial. However, only
13 anomalies are chargeable to this deployable structures category, and
they are all quite related to the specific spacecraft design. In other
words, the anomalies are all a function of the particular design selected,
and hence not amenable to any more generalized evaluation techniques.
2. Gyroscopes
The 11 gyro anomalies analyzed during this effort indicated
no problem areas that would justify in-space evaluation. One aspect was
noted however, which PRC feels is cause for concern, and this is the
early wear-outs that were reported. Three of the gyro anomalies were
attributed to wear-out, one after 37 days in orbit, one after 9 months,
and the third after a more respectable 18 months. A fourth anomaly
for which only limited information is available, may be a wear-out problem.
It is possible that improved lubricants, as discussed in Section IV,
would increase gyro service life. Also, some of the other 11 anomalies
involve noisy signals, a condition which could conceivably be related
to lubrication. With the exception of the wear-out problems and the po-
tential for improved lubricants, the data base offers no other background
information of interest to this study.
3. Power Conditioning
With 42 anomalies charged to power conditioning, this cate-
gory ranks as the sixth highest of all those established during this
study. Judging from this record, it would seem that some kind of effort
aimed at eliminating or precluding anomalies in this category would be
desirable. It is not clear, however, that this effort should take place
in space.
The equipment in this category includes regulators, battery charg-
ers, inverters, converters, etc. At least three anomalies in such equip-
ment have caused complete loss of a spacecraft, and several others have
considerably reduced mission accomplishments. Many anomalies, however,
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have involved noncatastrophic problems, many of which were possibly made
less severe by redundancy although that was not evaluated during this study.
It was noted during the analysis that postflight evaluations of manned
spacecraft revealed several blown fusistors, possibly indicating problems
in this area that were compensated for somehow.
The data base co'ntains a considerable amount of information on the
suspected or established causes of these power conditioning anomalies.
They range from design inadequacies and manufacturing defects to unan-
ticipated operating conditions. It appears that corrective actions for
these can best be developed on the ground. The few causes that are re-
lated to the space environment or in-space operation appear to be best
soluable by the more general efforts described in several of the recom-
mended experimental programs. Thus, while PRC feels that some type of
effort to deal with these numerous and potentially serious anomalies
would be advantageous, it appears that specific, in-space programs can
not be justified at this time.
4. Propulsion (Chemical)
A number of propulsion system anomalies were analyzed, but
it was concluded none of them presented a clear-cut case for an in-space
program. Before discussing the reason for this conclusion, the anomalies
considered should be noted.
a. On three spacecraft in one program a decrease in
predicted thrust was attributed to propellant degradation. On the first
two spacecraft, this was thought due to the effects of vacuum and time,
but oh the third, it was apparently obvious that it was a vendor quality-
control problem.
b. On one spacecraft and possibly another where it was
not reported as an anomaly, there was a pressure increase in a hydrazine
tank, which was attributed to incompatibility of the hydrazine and the
decomposing bladder material (butyl rubber). The pressure increase over .
the total mission life (approximately 180 days) was repoted to be 16 psi,
and some of this was thought due to temperature.
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c. Approximately half of the anomalies charged to the
propulsion category involved leaks in regulators, valves, thrusters, and
tanks. In the few cases where a cause was reported, these anomalies were
attributed to worn valve seats, possible damage from asteroids, and dam-
age induced by launch vibration.
d. Other propulsion anomalies include valve heater prob-
lems, thrust offset due to plume reflection, a nitrogen tank explosion,
and "stuck" valves, plus some other rather trivial problems.
With respect to the anomalies considered and summarized above, the
propellant degradation problem was solved, apparently by improved vendor
quality control, and there are no other instances of it in the data bank.
The bladder-hydrazine incompatibility is certainly something to be con-
sidered in future designs, especially for long-life spacecraft. But PRC
feels that in-space testing and evaluation is not justified, first be-
cause there are other approaches that do~no€ require a bladder, and sec-
ond, because ground test programs should be able to isolate any inherent
incompatibilities in a wide range of bladder materials in a far more cost
effective manner.
While the leakage anomalies do comprise slightly over half of all
those in the chemical propulsion category, the overall record in this
area is outstanding if one considers the amount of operational, propul-
sion hardware that has not malfunctioned. PRC feels that the record
clearly indicates that valves, thrusters, etc., can be designed and fab-
ricated to yield a long, trouble-free life.
The other propulsion anomalies summarized above involve design
problems for which solutions are now readily available.
5. Solar Array Drives
The situation with the solar array drive category is iden-
tical to that of deployable structures, as discussed in item "1" above.
While it was originally thought that 0-g observations might prove bene-
ficial, the 10 anomalies in this category are too design-specific to
justify any generalized program.
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6. Telemetry
The three anomaly categories in this overall group, together
with the number of anomalies charged to them, are encoding (33 anomalies),
sensors (25 anomalies) and RF equipment (40 anomalies). The encoding
anomalies involve such things as sync errors, missing or garbled chan-
nels, incorrect commutator stepping, etc. These anomalies are all of
the type one would expect from encoding equipment, and considering the
amount of hardware required to implement encoding functions, the number
of anomalies does not appear excessive. In general, they never resulted
in serious mission consequences, in many cases due to redundant equipment
or to the availability of other data channels which allowed any missing
or lost data to be interpreted by other means. Based on these consider-
ations, PRC does not feel that in-space experimentation with telemetry
encoding equipment is worthwhile.
A similar situation exists for telemetry sensors (i.e., thermistors,
pressure monitors, voltage and current monitoring devices, etc.). The
number of anomalies is not excessive for the number of such sensors in
the sample, and they never resulted in serious mission consequences.
The 40 anomalies charged to telemetry RF equipment seems excessive,
especially since this equipment consists, for the most part, of reasonably
straightforward VHF and UHF transmitters. It is not clear, however, that
in-space experimentation with regard to this equipment is warranted.
Eight of the 40 anomalies involve failed or inoperative transmit-
ters. For those cases where the PRC ££>ace Data Bank contains information
on the reasons for these failures, they are attributed to damage induced
by launch shock, a degraded transistor, a failed coax switch, and in two
cases, to a blown fuse. There are nine beacon transmitter problems,
with five of them involving noisy transmissions. The data base contains
no further useful information on these beacon anomalies.
SCO or VCO problems accounted for 11 more anomalies. Where the
data bank contains background information, these problems are attributed
to frequency drift and shifts to the lower band edge, and anomalous
drop-outs.
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Temperature problems are reported to have caused four anomalies—
a transmitter power amplifier failure due to overheating, a transmitter
turn-on problem due to low temperature, a high transmitter temperature
due to a base plate problem, and thermal action effecting the operation
of a coax relay.
The remaining eight anomalies appear to be one-of-a-kind situations,
such as a power monitoring detector malfunction due to a diode problem,
the shifting of the center frequency of a telemetry transmitter, momen-
tary transmission drop-outs, transmitter turn-on/turn-off delay problems,
and general down link degradation and fading.
It appears to PRC that ground-based programs would be more cost-
effective in resolving these telemetry-RF problems than in-space experi-
mentation. The available information on anomaly causes does not indi-
cate that environmental effects which cannot be simulated are involved.
In the cases where no cause for the anomaly is given, several of the
experiments recommended in Section IV, particularly the semiconductor,
radiation and antenna ones, could possibly yield general results that
would be applicable to telemetry RF equipment.
7. Wide Band Communications
This overall equipment group, which includes the anomaly
categories of wide band transmitters, receivers, transponders, and
"other" (such as synthesizers, feeds, etc., as well as interactions be-
tween equipments) is charged with 52 anomalies. Receiver and transponder
problems account for only five of these anomalies, while problems in the
"other" category account for 20, and transmitter problems to 27. Since
many of the problems in the "other" and "transmitter" categories were
found to be similar, they will be discussed together.
Of these 47 anomalies, three are directly related to antenna op-
erations, six are RFI problems, and one involves an up-link problem;
these three areas are covered in Section IV. The remainder of the anom-
alies, as discussed below, do not seem to1 offer possibilities for cor-
rection actions via in-space experimentation.
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Fifteen more of the anomalies involve anomalous conditions with
the down-link signal, such as loss-of or drops-in power, loss of carrier,
power fluctuations, or loss of the down-link signal. The data base con-
tains little information on the cause of these anomalies, so no conclus-
ions can be drawn. Another anomaly appeared to be a link problem which
was resolved on the ground.
Problems which seem to be a function of fabrication were noted in
four instances. In these cases, the problems were attributed to a mechan-
ical discontinuity, an intermittent open in a cable, a cabling impedance
discontinuity, and poor contact between a tuning screw and its grounding
point. Five anomalies involved early or late shutoff of transmitters or
drivers. While it is possibly of academic interest that this type of
anomaly occurred in dissimilar spacecraft, its frequency does not appear
to warrant concern.
Oscillator frequency drift or instability accounts for four anoma-
lies, with two being temperature related and another attributed to a con-
dition explained only as "high voltage."
The remaining eight anomalies occurred to TWT's or TWT circuitry.
For two of these, the information in the PRC Space Data Bank states only
that the TWT's degraded, and in a third instance only that a TWT failed.
Helix current was involved with two anomalies, in one case it was re-
ported to be too high, and in another to be varying. Also, variations
in TWT exciter drive was•the attributed cause for another anomaly. In
one case, the power output of a TWT amplifier dropped, but the data base
does not indicate any suspected cause. Finally, RF power was reflected
back into a TWT amplifier, resulting in erratic operation.
It is not clear to PRC that in-space experimentation would be cost-
effective in eliminating or reducing the problems associated with TWT's.
The state-of-the-art in this area is sufficiently advanced so that the
design problems and requirements should be well known. This is borne
out by the number of space communications systems utilizing TWT's that
have exhibited excellent performance. But the fact remains that TWT's
and their associated components do present design and fabrication prob-
lems, their high-voltage and alignment requirements being but two ex-
amples. For such reasons, some predict that solid state devices now
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coining into application will phase-out TWT systems. These devices include
Gunn diodes, gallium arsenide field effect transistors, IMPATT diodes, sil-
icon Schottky-barrier varistors, and varactors. PRC feels that since
such new devices will probably be widely used, it would be more practical
to utilize funds for in-space experimentation in this area, as described
under "Semiconductors" in Section IV.
8. Pyrotechnics
PRC considered anomalies in this area on the premise that
the space environment could create conditions that would effect the fir-
ing probability. However, the PRC Space Data Bank reveals that no ex-
plosive-actuated function has ever failed to occur due to a pyrotechnic
device anomaly. This is possibly because most pyrotechnic functions in-
corporate a high degree of redundancy, although this cannot be deter-
mined from the data base.
Based on this performance record, PRC feels in-space experiments
with pyrotechnic devices are not necessary* On the possibility, however,
that the anomalies associated with pyrotechnic devices might prove in-
formative on future design efforts, they are summarized as follows:
a. Pyrotechnic debris caused a few problems, including
shorting one antenna, and possibly degrading another, and clogging a
porous plug.
b. In one case, a "sneak path" was set up by a shorted
squib.
c. One explosive valve on an unmanned spacecraft did
not fire. Postflight evaluation revealed that several pyrotechnic de-
vices did not actuate on manned spacecraft.
9. Shrouds
PRC considered these because they are difficult, if not
impossible, to fully evaluate via ground tests. The data base, however,
contains only two shroud related problems, one a failure to eject which
was corrected on subsequent flights by changing the shroud material from
fiberglass to metal. The other involved explosive destruction of the
shroud honeycomb panels due to environmental effects during launch. This
record indicates to PRC that techniques for designing and fabricating
shrouds are well in hand.
10. Radiometers
The data base contains 31 identified radiometer problems;
there are a few others where it is not clear that the anomaly is charge-
able to a radiometer. Seven of these are attributed to interference, in-
cluding mutual interference between a television camera system and a
radiometer and between two radiometers, EMI from an antenna cooling fan,
and interference during appendage slews. In three cases, a chopper motor
or scanning motor failed, and two cases involved anomalous temperature
increases. On a spacecraft which did not attain the desired orbit, there
were problems with the mirror shields on two radiometers since they had
been designed for a lower orbit. In three cases, the data base only con-
tains reports that a radiometer failed.
The remaining 14 radiometer anomalies appear to be "one-of-a-kind"
occurrences, involving data drop-outs due to faulty solder joints, sun-
light entering an aperture due to spacecraft attitude, an obstructed "fov"
due to baffle design, an incorrectly positioned shutter, a saturated out-
put channel, and problems with a capacitor.
While this overall record indicates that radiometer reliability
could certainly improved, none of the anomalies analyzed involves condi-
tions for which in-space evaluation should be required. Hence, PRC feels
that improvements in radiometer reliability can be achieved more cost-
effectively during the design and fabrication stages.
11. Nonapplicable Environmental Effects
As indicated earlier, a major criterion for selecting can-
didate areas for in-space experimentation was that there be some factor
involved that was not amenable to ground evaluation. Anomalies result-
ing from the effects of the space environment certainly meet this cri-
terion. In analyzing this type of anomalies, PRC found groups for
which space experimentation appears cost-effective; these are discussed
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in Section IV of this report. There were, in addition, several environ-
mentally-induced anomalies for which space-experimentation does not ap-
pear reasonable. These anomalies, as summarized below, were "one-of-a-
kind" occurrences, and appear preventable by currently available design
techniques.
a. On one spacecraft, the lens of a TV system were
contaminated by the third stage rocket exhaust.
b. A spectrometer began degrading during launch, prob-
ably due to water condensation and icing.
c. For unknown reasons, the membrane of a micrometeorite
detector was punctured.
F. Observations
During the course of this effort, a number of observations were
made which, while not applicable to the objectives of this study, may
nevertheless be useful. These observations resulted from the analysis
of the data base EAR'S and their only common denominator is that they
stem from reported, anomalous spacecraft behavior. They have not been
analyzed, and they are offered here simply as observations that might
prove useful to pursue in future program planning and spacecraft design.
1. Similarities Within Programs
The PRC Space Data Bank contains EAR's on 43 space programs,
and of these 19 represent programs with two or more similar, or in some
cases, identical spacecraft. The similarities between reported anomalies
for spacecraft within a program is striking. Of the 19 programs with
similar spacecraft, the reported anomalies are quite repetitive within
the spacecraft on nine programs. In fact, for the eight spacecraft on
one program, the anomaly lists were virtually carbon copies. On six
other programs, there were several repititive anomalies within each pro-
gram, although the repetition is not as great as on the nine programs
indicated above. On only four programs were the anomalies on each space-
craft dissimilar.
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2. Recurring Anomalies
Another type of repitition was noted, this time recurring
anomalies of the same type on individual spacecraft. In some cases, the
anomaly would first be intermittent, and later "fail solid."
3. Mi s under s ta ndi ng s
Several anomalies were noted which seem to indicate a "com-
munication gap" between designers and operations personnel, perhaps due
to differences in the working vocabularies of these two groups. Most of
the anomalies of this type were sequencing errors, e.g., commanding a
certain function before other pre-requisite functions had been activated/
deactivated. A good illustration of this type situation is that on one
occasion, a star tracker "locked-out" and failed to respond to star acqui-
sition commands because of a prior command sequence. On another occasion,
high voltage was applied to three cameras too soon, which was attributed
to the design being incorrect for the requisite operational sequences.
Although it appears anomalies of this type never resulted in damage or
irreversible actions, the situation clearly presents such a potential.
Two factors noted as associated with these kinds of anomalies,
are (1) they occurred, as might be expected, on complex spacecraft, and
(2) it may well be that terminology plays a role in creating them.
With regard to spacecraft complexity, the overall anomaly pattern
of one of the most complex unmanned spacecraft ever launched, shows a
"clustering" of anomalies of this type, which may be suggestive of a
learning curve.
With respect to terminology, designers deal with a spacecraft in
terms of equipment, and their terminology is very equipment-oriented.
Operations personnel, on the other hand, deal with functions, and further,
with their "access" to these functions via ground equipment. The data
base EAR's contain both design.and operational information, and in sev-
eral cases there is such a considerable difference in the terminology
that, except for the title, one would have difficulty establishing that
it referred to the same spacecraft.
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4. Anomaly Threshold Level
It would appear, on the basis of very casual observations,
that there is a "threshold," or crossover point, in terms of the number
and extent of anomalies which is dependent on the implementation approach
at the system level. For instance, it appears that the anomalies of the
simpler spacecraft are dominated by certain types of problems, such as
experiment package or power supply malfunctions, and often, while there
may be few anomalies, they are likely to be severe. As spacecraft com-
plexity increases, and requires more equipment such as reaction wheels,
star trackers, etc., it would appear that the anomalies become more domi-
nated by attitude control system problems. The number of anomalies seems
to crossover the threshold level to some increased magnitude, although
many do not appear severe enough to jeopardize mission success.
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IV. RECOMMENDED EXPERIMENTAL AREAS
In the 22 subsections below, each of the 22 recommended experimental
areas is discussed. Each discussion includes a description of the problem
area, the rationale for recommending in-space experimental and evaluation
activities, and a brief discussion of a possible experimental approach.
In addition, a brief literature search was conducted to survey the state-
of-the-art and the results of this are also discussed. The objective of
this necessarily limited survey was to determine (1) if new techniques now
under development offered promising alternate approaches to problem areas,
and (2) the extent of activity now underway to resolve problem areas with
current technology.
1. Antennas
The data base contains 14 anomalies associated with antenna
equipment; they can be summarized as follows:
(1) Squib products shorted two antennas.
(2) There were two cases when a temperature problem in
the control electronics caused a mechanically despun
antenna to be inoperable for long periods.
(3) In another case, antenna signal strength dropped due
to increased temperature .in the antenna electronics.
(4) Two anomalies involved cross-coupling between two
antennas.
(5) One deployable antenna did not deploy to its full
length.
(6) One long antenna was distorted due to a "thermal
engine" effect.
(7) The pattern of one antenna was distorted due to
anomalous lobing.
(8) The characteristics of one antenna changed, probably
due to outgassing.
(9) In two instances, a diplexer and switch operated
only marginally due to inadequate interface design.
(10) One antenna was shorted by a set of deployed spheres
utilized in an experiment.
While these anomalies do not seem to indicate any consistent prob-
lem, they do point out the kinds of difficult-to-predict anomalies that
can occur. PRC is aware, for instance, that the equipments associated
with the mechanically-despun antenna anomalies received as detailed and
thorough design and development analyses as is humanly possible. It is
safe to assume that the problems that did occur could not have been en-
visioned beforehand, and thereby prevented.
PRC feels that a main reason for unforseeable antenna problems lies
in the difficult and complex testing requirements they pose. As pointed
out in Reference 14, antenna characteristics are normally assumed to be
completely described by the antenna radiation pattern, which is in turn
a function of several complicated and independent variables. Measure-
ment techniques usually consist of measuring antenna power variations as
a function of only one variable at a time. In addition, as discussed in
Reference 15, analysis of the mechanism of noise generation in an antenna
is complicated and the mechanism itself is not well understood. Hence,
in determining system signal-to-noise ratios, approximations of antenna
noise are usually based on the concept of equivalent noise temperature.
While many reasonably accurate equivalent noise temperatures are known,
they too involve many variables such as background noise from the sun,
moon, planets, etc., the effect of side and rear lobes, atmospheric con-
ditions, and antenna "front end" characteristics.
Based on both the complexity of dealing with all the variables
pertinent to antenna performance, and on the unforeseeable types of
anomalies that have occurred, PRC feels an in-space evaluation program
via the Shuttle would be worthwhile. Especially significant results are
anticipated in the area of new antenna approaches.
Antenna developments that can be expected in the coming decade
include "printed antennas" for microwave applications, reflectors
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fabricated with composite materials, and generally larger antennas for
deep space probes. Prototype testing of such systems via the Shuttle
would provide realistic measures of their performance as pertinent vari-
ables fluctuated.
The antenna radiation patterns could be determined for various
path lengths and elevation angles, and the effect of such atmospheric
conditions as rain and snow could be monitored, as could the effects of
lunar cycles, solar"disturbances, and radio stars. In addition, such
aspects as lobing and notching could be evaluated.
The mounting approach and location of the test antenna would de-
pend on its size and type, but the Shuttle should be able to accommodate
even large reflectors with no undue problems. PRC feels that if the per-
formance evaluation approach does not also subject antenna materials to
a complete "soak" in the space environment, additional steps should be
taken, possibly via the LDEF, to determine the potential for outgassing,
radiation damage, and bending or warping due to thermal stresses.
2. Array Degradation
The PRC Space Data Bank contains 23 solar array anomalies,
with 10 of these being attributed to array degradation. An interesting
aspect of these degradation.anomalies is that they are fairly evenly
distributed from 1962 to 1972. This spread, together with the reported
type of radiation causing the degradation, where such information is
available, is shown at the top of the following page.
Another interesting aspect is that on one spacecraft the degrada-
tion occurred within a few weeks after launch.
The other 13 "nondegradation" array anomalies cover a broad range.
On one spacecraft, berrylium-copper busses failed-open under thermal
stress, and three spacecraft had solar panel shorts, with one of these
being a shorted string. On another spacecraft, one board of cells failed,
but no further information is given. One spacecraft had a "sneak path"
See Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 26, 1976.
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1962 1964 1965 1966 1967 1969 1972
1. No further
information
2. High altitude
nuclear
detonation
3. No further
information
4. No further
information
5. Solar flare
radiation
6. Solar particle
damage
7. Ultraviolet
radiation
8. Particle radia-
tion, space heat
and ultraviolet
rays
9. No further
information
10. Solar flares
in the array, and on another, the solar cell short circuit characteris-
tics were high due to calibration via flight resistors that had not been
altitude calibrated. For the other cases, no further information is given,
including the one described rather cryptically as "solar panels failed
sequentially as each faced the sun."
PRC feels that the "nondegradation" anomalies do not pose suffi-
cient cause for concern to justify in-space evaluation. There is no con-
sistent cause which could be dealt with, and they appear preventable by
the proper design and development precautions. On the other hand, the
degradation anomalies appear to warrant evaluation via the shuttle be-
cause of their persistence, and because the response of solar cells to
space radiation can best be measured in space. Especially, new develop-
ments in solar cell technology such as "violet cells" and flexible arrays
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could benefit from in-space evaluations that would improve degradation
prediction capabilities.
The approaches for predicting array degradation are well under-
stood, but this still does not eliminate problems and uncertainties. Ref-
erence 26, for instance, describes the environmental factors that effect
solar panel output, and discusses in detail the uncertainties that are an
integral part of the prediction process. The error analyses in particular
are quite complex. Reference 17 discusses quite thoroughly the means of
simulating the various environmental factors and the problems associated
with this. The complexity of error analyses is again evident in this
document as are the extensive facilities and equipments required for ef-
fective simulation.
Reference 18 reports on a study of radiation-hardened cells, and
discusses tests conducted to evaluate various hardening approaches.
Among other things, this report points out that the behavior of highly
doped cells cannot be realistically extrapolated from that of lightly
doped cells.
Except for some of the radiation-hardened cells discussed in Ref-
erence 18, the three references above deal with conventional array ap-
proaches. Even so, the processes involved in predicting degradation and
designing and fabricating arrays that will produce the required power are
time-consuming and costly. In addition, the special environments of
interplanetary probes, as discussed in Reference 19, introduce other
array considerations.
It appears to PRC that several approaches to evaluation via the
Shuttle could result in less costly and time-consuming prediction activ-
ities as well as improved array performance. One promising, relatively
simple Shuttle program could be to space calibrate enough cells of the
required types to provide an ample supply of standard cells. As pointed
out in Reference 17, the availability of standard cells, which are nor-
mally calibrated by balloon tests or high altitude flights, is often too
limited for general use. As a result, secondary cells are calibrated
from these primary ones for use as working standards. Cell calibration
procedures via the Shuttle, it seems, could produce enough standard cells
to satisfy the requirements of any program.
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Another possibility for reducing the likelihood of array degrada-
tion would be to deploy test arrays in the LDEF to monitor their long-
term response to radiation. The approach to this could be similar to
that reported in Reference 61, where various types of cells, and ap-
proaches to soldering, coatings, cover slides, etc., were monitored on
an ATS-5 experiment. It appears that such an evaluation would be par-
ticularly useful in such developmental areas as "violet cells" and flex-
ible arrays. Reference 20 discusses both these approaches, and Reference
21 describes laboratory testing of "violet cells," the results of which
are quite promising. Reference 22 discusses a flexible, roll-up solar
array ("FRUSA") which was tested on a DoD spacecraft, with reportedly
successful results.
To sum up, solar cell and array evaluations via the LDEF would pro-
vide several advantages over currently available evaluation approaches.
The response to all forms of radiation could be monitored simultaneously,
which is not possible in test facilities equipped to simulate only certain
types of radiation. Retrieval of the cells would allow complete analysis
of the mechanisms of degradation, thus enabling corrective actions to be
established. Also, more readily usable and realistic degradation curves
could be derived in order to eliminate some of the complex analytical
procedures now required in the prediction process.
3. Batteries
Batteries, with a total of 52 anomalies, rank fourth high-
est among the problem area categories established during this study.
Many of these anomalies involve complete battery failure, and at least
eight spacecraft were rendered completely useless by battery anomalies,
and several others were severely degraded. In addition, the PRC Space
Data Bank contains two reports of batteries rupturing, and reports of a
number of wear-out problems. Among the other battery anomalies, causes
are attributed to insulation breakdown due to silver migration, cell •
leaks, cell shorts, cell reverals, and overheating and temperature prob-
lems. The earliest reported battery anomaly occurred on a spacecraft
launched in 1960; the latest on one launched in 1974.
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The problems associated with batteries are well known, but in some
cases poorly understood. Reference 23, for instance, states that ground
test programs have not demonstrated the state-of-the-art capability of a
particular battery system, but rather the capability of a particular manu-
facturer to produce a particular lot of cells at a given time. This re-
port goes on to state that on one program, the variations in cells from
different lots required design changes in the battery chargers. It also
points out, with respect to separator problems which are common to Ni-cad,
silver zinc and silver cadmium batteries, that improvements are being
made but no breakthroughs are in sight. Reference 24, a report on an ac-
celerated testing program for space batteries, states that no such pro-
gram existed before it, and that little was known about battery degrada-
tion processes.
On the other hand, Reference 25, a report on an evaluation program
now entering its twelfth year, indicates that the program has solved the
battery problems that occurred on several programs. Ni-cad, silver zinc,
and silver cadmium cells have been evaluated with regard to such variables
as types of separators, plates, seals, auxiliary electrodes, etc., and the
reported results include data on which cells last longer, the best opera-
tional regimes, etc.
While PRC agrees that such evaluation programs contribute signifi-
cantly to battery improvements, it still appears that two major overlapp-
ing problems remain unresolved. First, to be effective, the testing and
evaluation programs must be quite complex and costly. Reference 24 pro-
vides an indication of this in the detailed models and analyses utilized
in the accelerated testing program it discusses. Also, Reference 26,
which describes testing of specific cells, reports on a wide range of
leak tests, capacity tests, charge efficiency tests, etc. The require-
ment for complex and costly evaluation, it seems to PRC, presents diffi-
cult tradeoff choices in terms of how much testing to conduct at the
upper, "generic approach" level, and how much at the more detailed level
of specific cells for specific applications. In other words, testing
and evaluations can be designed to effect general improvements in, say,
Ni-cad batteries, or Ni-cad batteries with a certain type separator, or
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they can be designed to eliminate observed deficiencies in batteries
being utilized on a specific program.
The second problem referred to above involves new developments in
battery technology. These include nickel-hydrogen batteries, batteries
with integral heat pipes, and batteries capable of operating in the kilo-
watt range. In addition to the problems and aspects common to the test-
ing of any battery, these new developments will impose unique problems
and requirements.
PRC feels that evaluations via the Shuttle would prove more effec-
tive and less costly in the final development stages of these new battery
technologies than would ground testing. The batteries with heat pipes
pose the same kinds of questions discussed in subsection 9, below, under
"Heat Pipes," and their thermal control aspects should be evaluated in
the same manner. In addition, the absence of convection in the space
environment should allow more realistic appraisals of both the KW-range
and the nickel hydrogen batteries' performance under thermal cycling and
thermal extremes. Also the potential for condensation, outgassing or
sublimation from cell electrodes could be determined. Such factors as
these, which are more a function of the basic approach than of design
and fabrication techniques, could be evaluated by placing test cells
in the Shuttle payload bay. It appears that useful information could
be obtained in this manner over five to ten missions.
Factors that are more a function of design and fabrication tech-
niques would require longer duration testing,- either via the LDEF or via
deployed equipment packages. One advantage of this would be that charge/
discharge cycles could be adjusted on subsequent revisits to provide
information on optimum depth of discharge. Also eventual retrieval
would allow an in-depth analysis of wear-out mechanisms.
Documents that PRC found useful on the state-of-the-art in these areas
are as follows: Reference 20: Nickel hydrogen batteries; Reference 27:
Nickel hydrogen batteries; Reference 28: Batteries with integral heat
pipes; and Reference 29: Kilowatt batteries.
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4. Camera Equipment
Camera equipment, with a total of 69 anomalies, ranks third
highest of all problem area categories examined during this effort. These
camera anomalies run the gamut from vidicon wear-out, shutter malfunctions,
and contrast and synchronization problems to circuit failures or malfunc-
tions. Vidicon wear-out or degradation due to age is often cited as the
cause for the reported anomalies. An unusual aspect of this is the dis-
parate times given. On one spacecraft, the wear-out times given for each
of three vidicons are less than two months, approximately 3*5 months, and
8 months. The less than two-month life is the shortest in the PRC Space
Data Bank; the longest is approximately 27 months.
Many of the camera equipment anomalies considerably reduced a space-
craft's ability to fulfill its mission requirements, and in two reported
cases caused loss of the mission. In one of these cases, camera anomalies
resulted in discontinuing the use of a meteorological spacecraft; in the
other, loss of the spacecraft was thought due to a momentary turn-on of
a television system at critical pressure during boost, causing corona
and arcing conditions.
The brief literature search conducted as a part of this effort
turned up no papers or reports on the subject of TV system performance,
reliability, life characteristics, or the present state-of-the-art. The
information that was found, References 30, 31, and 32 discuss imaging
approaches possible with charge-coupled devices (CCD's). While a CCD
image sensor has been developed and employed in a minature TV camera,
it appears that much development remains to be done.
One area currently under development involves the number of de-
fect-free, high density elements necessary for high resolution. A CCD
chip providing high resolution could require a 500 by 500 matrix, which
means about a quarter-million elements. Many predict that this will be
within the state-of-the-art by the late 1970's or early 1980's.
Since CCD imaging approaches appear so promising for replacing
other imaging approaches, it is recommended that they be evaluated via
the Shuttle. They can be configured into an area sensor array or a lin-
ear sensor array, and electronic exposure control can eliminate mechanical
shutters.
j
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It is also recommended that the first stage of this Shuttle ex-
periment consist of evaluating the inherent characteristics of CCD chips
as discussed under Semiconductors, subsection 17, below. When it is
evident that design and fabrication techniques for the chips are well-
in-hand, the second stage could consist of evaluating complete camera
systems. Characteristics which should be evaluated as particularly per-
tinent to the space environment include achieved resolution in-orbit,
the effects of albedo and stray light, contrast control features, and
the response to temperature extremes and solar heating. This second
stage evaluation could probably be accomplished with test systems
mounted in the Spacelab.
It is further recommended that the third, and final, stage of
this experiment evaluate long-term operational characteristics and
achieved life-time in space. This could be accomplished by deploying
a test system and monitoring its performance via revisits, then even-
tually retrieving it for complete analysis on the ground.
5. Computers
While few spacecraft have yet carried programmable, general
purpose computers, PRC feels that the LSI microprocessors now coming onto
the market will make it hard to justify not using an on-board computer,
even for small spacecraft, low-budget programs. Together with high
density, light weight memories (see subsection 20,'below), microproc-
essors can handle many functions now implemented by separate equipments
for command and control, data formatting, sequencing, and attitude
control.
Since so few spacecraft have utilized computers, the PRC Space
Data Bank contains little information on their record. All the later
manned spacecraft carried computers, and the PRC Space Data Bank con-
.tains one reported anomaly; PRC is also aware of another anomaly which
is not covered in the PRC Space Data Bank reports. Even so, the flight
durations of the manned spacecraft were too short to provide any insights
on long-term computer operation, which will be required for long-life
communications satellites and deep space probes.
A quite recently launched spacecraft has an on-board computer, and
two anomalies have been charged to it. On another program, computers on
two spacecraft failed, and an anomaly on each of two other spacecraft in
that program may be computer malfunctions, although this is not clear.
Another spacecraft included in the PRC Space Data Bank is known to have
had a computer, and a "processor" anomaly is reported but it is not ob-
vious that the processor and the computer are one and the same.
The present hardware area of command and control, including pro-
grammers, sequencers, controllers, etc., is most related to computers.
They resemble each other in that both are generally implemented with
digital logic, and on spacecraft they can be expected to perform the
same functions.
The PRC Space Data Bank contains a significant amount of informa-
tion on command and control. There are 43 reported logic problems and
26 reported timing and sequencing problems. This total of 69 anomalies
ranks third highest along with camera equipment anomalies. In addition,
there are 23 other anomalies associated with registers and memories and
some of the 38 reported spurious command problems are undoubtedly due to
logic malfunctions. While many of these problems have not had serious
effects, a significant number have reduced mission effectiveness, and
two have caused loss of the associated spacecraft.
PRC interprets this as indicating that the record for command and
control leaves something to be desired. Further, it is not clear at this
point that extensive implementation of command and control functions with
microprocessors will improve this record in the near future. The in-space
evaluation of microprocessors as semiconductor devices, as discussed in
subsection 17, below, should be useful in eliminating inherent design
and fabrication defects that are best detected in the space environ-
ment. Judging from the operational characteristics of ground-based com-
puters as well as the PRC Space Data Bank anomaly record for on-board
computers, however, problems are still likely to arise due to unantici-
pated interactions at the system level.
These types of problems arise because the conditions leading to
such things as "logic races," sneak paths, and worst cause accumulations
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of propagation delays cannot be adequately established under test condi-
tions. In other words, computer testing programs can be written to evaluate
all specific computer functions (e.g., "add," "multiply," "store," etc.),
most functional combinations, and typical operational routines. It is
never possible with test routines, though, to simulate all the stresses
a computer will encounter in actual operation simply because the number
of possible hardware operational states is virtually infinite.
PRC has found on other studies and in the brief literature search
conducted during this study, that the subject of space-borne computer re-
liability usually emphasizes the need for fault-tolerant computers, and
to a lesser degree, for reliable software, two aspects that are unques-
tionably important. However, the equally important need for operational
integrity under hardware stresses resulting from program-commanded op-
erational states does not seem to have been specifically addressed.
The anomalies that would come under this heading are not "faults," in
the sense that they could be mitigated or "worked around" by a fault
tolerant system. They result from numerous interactions, including that
of the operational environment as it pertains to data flow, computational
load, etc.
PRC feels that the most feasible way that operational integrity can
be assured is by evaluating performance under actual operating conditions.
This allows unpredictable operating states to. occur, and those resulting
in anomalous behavior can be analyzed and corrective actions determined.
Thus, evaluation via the Shuttle seems logical.
One approach to this experiment would be to combine the evalua-
tion of spaceborne computers with that of some other device with a long-
life requirement. The self-lubricated bearing evaluation, as discussed
in subsection 12, below, seems an especially promising candidate if a
rate-measuring package is used. The computer could accept rate inputs
and perform any number of realistic computations without interfering
with the operation of the rate-measuring package. Since revisits and
retrieval would occur, a diagnostic display panel could be included so
that computer anomalies could be readily analyzed and corrective ac-
tions could be incorporated without lengthy interruptions that would
compromise long-term evaluation.
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6. Day/Might Effects
The PRC Space Data Bank contains nine anomalies that oc-
curred at or about the spacecraft day/night or night/day transition.
These anomalies can be summarized as follows:
(1) Data from a radiometer was degraded at the day/night
and night/day transitions due to inadequate mirror
shield design.
(2) A radiometer experienced sunlight interference due
to inadequate shielding design at the night/day
transition.
(3) A spacecraft exhibited roll and yaw perturbations
after the night/day transition due to sun inter-
ference in the horizon scanner during attitude
error corrections.
(4) Sunlight reflections from the spacecraft structure
caused ACS errors at the day/night transition.
(5) The output of a solar array drive amplifier was
excessively high as the spacecraft exited from the
earth's umbra due to either a potentiometer mal-
function, slip ring contamination, or shading
effects.
(6) An experiment package exhibited an irregular earth
scan six to eight minutes after earth day, possibly
due to thermal effects.
(7) One spacecraft experienced boom flutter at sun rise,
probably due to solar heating.
(8) The output of a spacecraft rate measuring package
was high near the day/night transition due to
some unexplained energy input.
(9) A power system day/night switch exhibited excessive
switching.
PRC feels that the fact that nine such anomalies occurred indi-
cates some degree of incomplete understanding of the effects of day/night
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and night/day transitions. While the PRC Space Data Bank contains the
likely causes of seven of these anomalies, it appears that the causal in-
fluences could not be foreseen and thereby mitigated during design and de-
velopment. For instance, even if it were possible to simulate the full
range of transition conditions, the testing costs would be prohibitive.
Similarly, compuerized, analytical simulations could not be expected to
include a sufficient number of parameters to fully evaluate transition
effects.
PRC feels that in-space observations are required to provide a
full understanding of these transition characteristics. Since the num-
ber of anomalies and their dates of occurrence indicates a persistent
but not extensive problem, the effort associated with these observations
need not be excessive. Its objective should be to collect an on-the-spot,
annotated set of data covering from 20 to 50 transitions. While measure-
ments of temprature variations, albedo from different sources, and fluc-
tuations in energy inputs should be included in this data, PRC feels the
direct observations and the capability to interpret transition effects
as they are occurring offers the greatest potential for extending the
understanding of this area.
7. Earth Effects
Many aspects of this recommended experiment are similar to
those of the day/night transition experiment discussed in subsection 5,
above. In this case, the data base contains five anomalies that were
caused in some manner by effects of the earth on spacecraft equipment.
. 7
These anomalies can be summarized as follows:
(1) A power regulator failed to change modes due to the
effect of the earth's penumbra on automatic trans-
fer circuitry.
(2) Television pictures were distorted due to modula-
tion by the earth's field at spacecraft spin rates.
(3) The sensitivity of an infrared interferometer de-
creased due to increased temperature of the optics
housing, caused in turn by earth albedo entering
the housing.
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(4) On a spacecraft equipped with TV cameras to monitor
the behavior of a long boom, the lower boom tip tar-
gets could not be seen due to earth brightness.
(5) On another spacecraft equipped with a camera for
monitoring the behavior of small balls ejected
from the spacecraft, the reflection of light from
the surface of the earth masked the object ball.
As was the case with the day/night transition experiment, the
number of the earth effects anomalies and their dates of occurrence
indicate a persistent but not extensive problem stemming, it would ap-
pear, from a less than complete understanding of these effects. Again,
the restrictions associated with test simulations or analytical models
makes direct in-space observations the most promising approach for gain-
ing new information. Except for the fact that anomalies 4 and 5 above
are almost identical, the only common factor that appears consistently
is the effect of the earth's albedo, including that of the penumbra.
With respect to anomalies 4 and 5, approaches of the type reported in
Reference 33 could possibly be applied to improve camera performance.
This document, which recommends improvements for airborne TV cameras,
ground telescope systems and air traffic control cameras, describes
contrast enhancement of weak targets seen against a bright background.
However, while such anomalies as 4 and 5 could probably be dealt
with on an individual basis, it appears to PRC that a more general approach
that provided usable, background information would be more advantageous.
A modest level-of-effort experiment to accumulate albedo data is recom-
mended as a possible, generalized approach. This data would allow more
precise design evaluations of a number of spacecraft equipment types.
Via monitoring equipment carried as a Shuttle payload, such factors as
background luminance and irradiance for various fields of view could be
collected. To preclude the costly accumulation of vast amounts of
difficult-to-analyze data, PRC feels the objective of this experiment
must limit data collection to that pertinent to the proper operation of
spacecraft equipment.
8. Gravity Gradient
PRC feels that the information in the PRC Space Data Bank
on gravity gradient stabilization neither confirms nor denies the high
reliability and successful performance expected of this approach. Ex-
hibit IV-1 summarizes this information for the 17 spacecraft in the PRC
Space Data Bank known to be gravity gradient stabilized. Another three
spacecraft are not included in this record; they carried quite sophisti-
cated subsystems for evaluating this stabilization approach in space,
but launch vehicle problems on two of them and an early system malfunc-
tion on the third precluded informative evaluation efforts.
While the record indicates that gravity gradient systems have per-
formed successfully, a number of anomalies have occurred and there has
been only a limited number of spacecraft which have provided experience.
Since gravity gardient stabilization is primarily a passive approach,
it should offer benefits in reliability as well as economics over active
stabilization approaches requiring such equipments as reaction wheels,
attitude sensors, thrusters, etc. For applications where precise point-
ing is not required, PRC feels these benefits make gravity gradient
stabilization logical choice. Applications that PRC foresees include
spacecraft utilizing ranging techniques for marine navigation, those
carrying experiment packages for monitoring such things as solar flare
radiation levels or background noise at radio wavelengths, and, not in-
conceivably, for spacecraft carried "piggyback" to orbit other planets.
The problems of analyzing and qualifying gravity gradient systems
on the ground are well known. In addition to the impossibility of simu-
lating the 0-g environment, solar-thermal effects are difficult to re-
produce, especially for configurations involving long booms. Computer
simulations, while useful, become too complex to handle if they investi-
gate more than three to five factors of interest, and even then require
simplifying assumptions and empirical insights for their formulations.
For instance, Reference 34 describes a computerized model for determin-
ing the influence of solar heating on the low frequency, dynamic stability
of a gravity gradient spacecraft. While exercise of this model was able
to explain the source of anomalous behavior in a blaval Research
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EXHIBIT IV-1 - GRAVITY GRADIENT STABILIZATION PERFORMANCE AND
RELIABILITY INFORMATION SUMMARY
1. Two spacecraft stabilized upside down, one due to the jet effects of
a subliming solid used as a release mechanism.
2. Excessive spin rate delayed G/G capture; the spacecraft attitude
during this period caused the battery temperature to rise.
3. A de-spin mechanism did not function because the spacecraft spin rate
was too low to cause release.
4. A G/G boom did not deploy fully.
5. On one spacecraft, 750' booms have been successfully deployed.
6. On one spacecraft:
o A marginal lock on gravity due to rod bending and
twisting, with thermal bending being the driving
force, caused the spacecraft to intermittently turn
upside down, then right itself.
o Solar heating caused boom flutter at spacecraft
sunrise.
o Erroneous equilibrium orientation occurred due to
complex boom interactions.
7. One spacecraft never reached static equilibrium.
8. A prior experiment turn-on prevented boom deployment on the first
attempt.
9. One spacecraft did not capture after boom deployment due to complex
interactions.
10. A damper boom did not deploy due to a malfunction in a "stop device."
11. One spacecraft underwent continuing spin-up due to complex interactions.
Laboratories' spacecraft, the model and its computer program are so ex- ,
tremely complex that only boom thermal bending could be considered. In
fact, one of the recommendations of this referenced report concerns the
need to obtain a much better physical understanding of the behavior of a
boom exposed to solar heating, including the effects of sun-angle and the
boom end conditions on actual thermal deflection.
From the preceding considerations, PRC feels that in-space experi-
mentation via the Shuttle could provide useful information for the de-
sign of gravity gradient systems. This experimentation could include
direct observation and measurement of boom behavior in response to such
factors as:
o Solar pressure
o Magnetic torques
o Eccentricity
o Thermal profile, including sun angle
o Vibration
In addition, absorbtivity, thermal lag, and hinge effects as well
as interactions of many of these factors could be monitored.
PRC feels that the objective of this experimentation should be to
provide an information baseline that would not otherwise be available.
In other words, the experiment should provide information that will ex-
tend the capabilities of computerized simulations and provide the de-
signer with empirical behavior data. One approach to the experiment
would be to position a gravity gradient stabilized, boiler-plate struc-
ture via the Shuttle's Remote Manipulator System. Observations and
monitoring could be accomplished in several ways. Motions recorded on
video tape, with a known and manually established reference background,
could be correlated with local measurements of magnetic field strength,
sun angle, etc. Reference grids could be positioned via EVA, and
strain gages, temperature monitors, etc., could be manually read and
repositioned to gain more information on unusual occurrences.
PRC feels that possibly two of the most significant aspects of
this experiment will be the opportunity to observe and monitor boom
This spacecraft is not included in the PRC Space Data Bank.
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deployment and spacecraft capture, possibly on multiple occasions, and
to retrieve the system for subsequent ground evaluation. Also, the op-
portunity to conduct the experiment at several altitudes and inclinations
may prove to be of considerable value.
9. Heat Pipes
Since heat pipes have only recently begun to be used on
spacecraft, the PRC Space Data Bank contains almost no information on
them. The available data, which covers two spacecraft, is however quite
interesting. On one spacecraft, it is reported that they worked quite
well; on the other, heat pipes contributed to an anomaly that rendered
the spacecraft virtually useless.
The anomalous situation involved an accumulation of worst-case
effects which imparted torques that caused the spacecraft to spin stabilize
end-over-end, thus severely restricting solar power availability, antenna
coverage and experiment packages' fields-of-views. The torques responsi-
ble for this came from a number of sources, with one being generated by
the fluid in the heat pipes.
PRC has not seen this heat pipe problem addressed, possible be-
cause it can be evaluated realistically only in a 0-g environment, and
possibly because the potential torques are felt to be so low as to be
of little concern. The concerns that are addressed include entrapment
of gas bubbles within arteries, wicking action, and choice of fluids
and materials.
Many currently feel that variable conductance heat pipes are the
ultimate development for spacecraft thermal control. If heat pipes are
to become widely used, PRC feels they should be evaluated via the Shuttle.
The spacecraft with the torque problem was reasonably straightforward—
it was conservatively designed, its basic subsystems utilized equipment
types well within the state-of-the-art, and it underwent a thorough test
program. If the magnitudes of the torques could have been predicted, it
can be assumed that measures would have been taken to preclude the
problem.
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A possible approach to this recommended Shuttle experiment would
be to combine a mounting that allowed freedom in all three axes with a
package containing heat pipes and sensors. This could be extended via
the Remote Manipulator Arm and the torques of the unrestrained package
could be monitored. Arrangements could be provided for clamping the
package in any axis, then measuring response during various Shuttle
maneuvers. In addition, this experiment could provide information on
the formation of gas bubbles and wicking action.
PRC feels a point is in order concerning the heat pipe approach
selected for this experiment. Reference 35 describes a large, variable
conductance heat pipe util'izing a transverse header and ammonia as a
working fluid. This is reportedly a novel device that eliminates en-
trapment of gas bubbles. While this was the only report on the state-
of-the-art and its advancement found during the brief literature search,
doubtlessly other heat pipe approaches are under development. Since
there are so many possible combinations of configuration, materials,
working fluids, etc., it appears that the selection of a device, or de-
vices, for evaluation should be based on the most promising approaches.
10. Horizon Scanners
The PRC Space Data Bank contains 14 anomalies associated
with horizon scanner/earth sensors. One each of these anomalies is at-
tributed to magnetized ball bearings, failure of a sensing head, low
sensitivity, improper threshold, and a leak in a pressurized container.
Two additional anomalies are attributed to inadequate design. The re-
maining seven, or half the anomalies, are due to sensing incorrect light
sources. This has ranged from sun interference (four cases) to track-
ing cold clouds (two cases), to sensing Venus stray light (one case).
The potential for sensing incorrect light sources is well known,
but since the data base reveals that anomalies of this type occurred on
spacecraft launched from 1960 to 1972, it appears that problems remain
to be solved. Since a number of approaches are possible for detecting
the earth as a reference, the approaches for solving these problems can
involve a number of choices. Reference 36, for instance, reports that
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the CO absorption band in the atmosphere is most suitable for accurate
earth horizon detection. The reasons stated for this are that reflected
sunlight hardly contributes to this band, canceling out day and night
side differences in radiance; in addition, Hot deserts or cold clouds
do not effect earth signals in this band. For the application discussed
in this report, the detector chosen was an immersed thermistor bolometer,
although the author acknowledges that future horizon sensors will probably
utilize pyroelectric detectors once they are space qualified.
Another approach, as discussed in Reference 37 utilizes an array
of four fixed point, horizon trackers, each independently controlled by
a thermocuple drive mechanism which centers the tracker's mirror on the
horizon limb. Still another variation, as described in Reference 38,
utilizes a radiometric approach with bolometers. It can be expected
that other approaches using charge-coupled devices for infrared imaging,
as mentioned in Reference 30, may become possible within this decade.
Also research now being conducted on Josephson-junction devices for
high speed computer logic (see Reference 30) may result in spin-offs
that will allow their application as advanced infrared detectors.
While the various possible approaches, both current and future,
involve many "approach-unique" aspects, they all share the common re-
quirement to accurately distinguish some given earth characteristics an
and to ignore all others. Ground facilities are capable of simulating
some earth characteristics, and of some potential interference sources.
It is not possible, however, to simulate the complete, operational en-
vironment with its multitude of radiation sources at numerous levels,
bandwidths, intensities, etc. Thus, PRC recommends a Shuttle pro-
gram with the dual objective of obtaining information applicable in
earth sensor design and of evaluating the performance of new sensor
approaches.
Obtaining information for design use could be accomplished by
measurements taken from the Shuttle payload bay. ' The specific infor-
mation collected (i.e., the bandwidth, etc.) would depend on the earth
sensing approach under consideration, but generally it would include
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radiance profiles and data on such aspects as latitude-dependent factors,
earth oblateness, and seasonal and diurnal effects.
Evaluating the performance of new sensor approaches could also be
initially accomplished by test packages mounted in the payload bay, al-
though evaluation of long-term performance would require utilization of
the LDEF. Tile initial evaluation should monitor the test sensor's per-
formance under a wide range of attitude conditions and seasonal and
diurnal variations. The package used for the long-term evaluation
could eventually be retrieved for a detailed analysis of any degradation
incurred.
11. Ion Engines
The PRC Space Data Base contains information on only two
spacecraft which are known to have carried ion engines. One spacecraft
carried one engine, the other spacecraft carried two engines. None of
the three ion engines could be used.
On the spacecraft with the one engine, interference with telem-
etry and attitude control resulted in the ion engine being shut-off and
not used after only a few hours of operation. On the spacecraft with
two engines, one engine operated successfully after initial turn-on, but
then failed to turn-on on all subsequent attempts. The second engine
experienced a similar turn-on failure, apparently on the-first attempt.
This information in the PRC Space Data Bank indicating lack of
in-space experience with ion engines coincides with that reported in
Reference 39. This document reports that SERT-II is the only space-
craft with an extensive thruster operational history. SERT-II carried
two mercury-ion engines (the three in the PRC Space Data Bank are
cesium engines), and according to Reference 39, one operated approxi-
mately 4,000 hours and then developed a short in the accelerator grids.
The other operated about 2,000 hours before it incurred the same failure.
The most well known and wide spread concern regarding ion engines
is the danger of thruster efflux deposits contaminating spacecraft sur-
faces. The above-referenced document, in fact, reported on a detailed
Not in the PRC Space Data Bank.
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study of SERT-II flight termal data to determine what, if any, contamina-
tion had occurred. The study found that only experimental solar cells
mounted near the edge of the thruster exhaust had been contaminated.
Contamination can occur, however, and it is a function of space-
craft geometry, charge, shielding, etc. Reference 40, for instance,
reports on a ground evaluation program that determined that almost any
imaginable surface, coating, or lens material would be contaminated if
exposed to the thrust products of a cesium engine.
Thus, while the potential for contamination certainly remains a
valid concern, PRC feels that other aspects of ion engine operation
should also receive attention. Neither the PRC Space Data Bank nor
SERT-II's operational history provides any assurance that ion engines
have yet reached the stage where reliable operation and a reasonably
long service life can be achieved.
The difficulties associated with ground testing to determine the
contamination potential have long been recognized. Large test chambers
are required for even very basic, prototype units, and such factors as
the interaction of the thruster beam and the chamber walls introduces
uncertainty. Determining the other aspects of ion engine operation on
the ground seems to PRC to be impossible.
The beam forming mechanisms and the ion generating devices, for
instance, rely on a variety of material properties and operational-
environmental conditions for their proper operation. Either alone or
in combination, exposure to the space environment and the environment
created by ion engine operation must certainly influence the long-term
reliability of these equipment elements. It seems to PRC that these
overall effects depend on the behavior of charged particles in 0-g
and vacuum, and therefore require the space environment for proper
evaluation. Since the propulsion characteristics of ion engines offer
such promise for future spacecraft, one example being for stationkeeping
on large communications satellites, PRC recommends experimentation via
the Shuttle.
On approach to such experimentation would be to evaluate the long-
term effects of the space environment on typical ion-engine components
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via the LDEF. The objective of this experiment should be to determine
whether any degradation occurs that would effect such aspects of ion
engine performance as beam forming, ion generation, charged particle con-
tainment, .etc.
Another approach would be to deploy an ion engine package via the
Shuttle, then, with the Shuttle maintaining sufficient distance to pre-
clude contamination, monitor and map the fields and particle tracks pro-
duced by thrusting. This would provide information for use in contamina-
tion studies, and thrust impulses large enough to cause navigation prob-
lems should not be required. If this were repeated over a number of
Shuttle revisits, indications of long-term performance could be obtained.
•In any event, -retrieving the engine package and evaluating it on the
ground should provide valuable insights for designing engines with in-
creased service lives.
12. Lubricants
The PRC Space Data Bank contains several anomalies attrib-
uted to lubrication problems, some of which are associated with equip-
ment discussed elsewhere such as tape recorders and gimballed equipment.
Other anomalies caused by lubrication problems include a drive motor
failure, gyro "wear-out" due to a frozen bearing, and erratic operation
of a pitch flywheel, which eventually resulted in an emergency (see
subsection 15, below).
In general, however, review of the data base indicates that the
behavior of presently used lubricants in the space environment is reason-
ably well understood. Still, there is a widely recognized need for im-
proved lubricants, especially in view of the long lives required of com-
munications satellites and deep space probes. Self-lubricated bearings
are receiving much attention, as are new compounds such as Teflon-
thickened polysiloxane which are reported to have significantly increased
mean-times-between failure.
See, for instance, Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 26, 1976.
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Thus, based on the in-space anomalies that have occurred and on
the fact that such effects as outgassing and composition changes due to
the space environment cannot be adequately determined on the ground, PRC
recommends that evaluations of new lubricants be conducted via the Shuttle.
For new lubricating materials, samples placed in the LDEF and retrieved
at intervals up to one year could be analyzed for composition changes,
ionization due to radiation, impending structural instabilities, etc.
For new lubricating approaches, such as self-lubricating bearings, active
testing involving actual operation seems indicated. Since the data base
reveals a number of gyro wear-out failures (see subsection III.E.2), it
might be advantageous to "kill two birds with one stone" and deploy a
simple rate measuring package utilizing self-lubricated bearings.
Shuttle revisits for inspection and analysis could be conducted on a
routine basis, with eventual retrieval for extensive evaluation on the
ground.
13. Nuclear Power Supplies
Since nuclear power supplies have not been widely used on
spacecraft, the PRC Space Data Bank contains little information on them.
The information that is available, however, appears to PRC to be of some
interest with regard to the objectives of this study.
Radioisotope power supplies (RIPS) are known to have been carried
on spacecraft in four programs included in the PRC Space Data Bank. No
anomalies are specifically attributed to these, but a power supply failure
caused loss of one spacecraft on a program that utilized RIPS; it is not
clear from the available information whether this power supply was a
RIPS.
Another spacecraft carried a liquid sodium-potassium fission re-
actor, and it experienced one direct and one indirect anomaly. The di-
rect anomaly, which was thought to be possibly due to deposition of out-
gaseed materials on insulators, involved a decline in the resistance to
ground of the thermoelectric converter. The indirect anomaly occurred
when a voltage regulator failed, thereby placing the high reactor volt-
age on the main bus and causing the entire spacecraft to become inoperable.
This anomaly occurred after 43 days in-orbit.
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Whether nuclear power supplies will be used to any extent in the
future appears open to question. Reference 20 reports that in the near
future, their cost and attendant ground handling problems will probably
restrict their use to special situations such as outer planet explora-
tions. Another document surveyed during the literature search, which
was a rather thinly disguised commercial for the manufacturer's product,
claimed that RTG's (radioisotope thermoelectric generators) now offer
many advantages for earth-orbit applications. Reference 41 objectively
evaluates the status of RTG development and concludes that means will
soon be available for producing a new generation of RTG's which will
meet weight, performance, and reliability requirements.
PRC feels that if RTG's become a viable power supply alternative,
in-space testing will be highly desirable.' They pose the same, if not
higher, potential for composition changes in materials as discussed
in subsection 11, above, for ion engines, and, as with ion engines,
this can greatly alter performance characteristics. In addition, their
high power output at beginning-of-life requires "dumping" power initially,
sizing the unit for adequate power at its decreased levels, and design-
ing control circuitry capable of handling both the high initial power
and the subsequent decreased levels. Evaluating the performance of
the control circuitry under actual operating conditions, possibly via
the LDEF, would provide valuable information on long-term characteristics.
14. " Radiation
The PRC Space Data Bank contains eight anomalies, in addi-
tion to array degradation as discussed in subsection 2, and the tran-
sistor problem discussed in subsection 17, which were attributed to the
effects of radiation. These anomalies can be summarized as follows:
(1) On two spacecraft in one program, a neon reference
for an infrared interferometer degraded, with one
attributed to high radiation exposure early in the
mission, and the other to energetic particle
Reference 42 discusses the design of control circuitry for .meeting
these requirements.
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bombardment. The high radiation exposure also
caused degradation to an experiment package.
(2) Two spacecraft on another program experienced
shifts in spacecraft potential.
(3) A Gieger-Mueller tube failed due to radiation
damage.
(4) An ultraviolet monitor package degraded due to
radiation damage.
(5) The power system of an interplanetary spacecraft
exhibited anomalous fluctuations that were possibly
due to Jovian radiation.
The extent of experimentation via the Shuttle that should be under-
taken with respect to radiation and its effects, it appears, must be con-
sidered from two standpoints. These are (1) current knowledge of the
space radiation environment and its effects on various materials, and
(2) the areas in which Shuttle experimentation could most feasibly ex-
tend this knowledge.
Much is currently known about radiation and its effects on many
presently available materials. Reference 43, for instance, examines
the space radiation environment and its effects on the various compon-
ents and materials utilized in multiplier phototubes. Except for this
reference, however, the literature search conducted as part of this
effort turned up no recent papers (i.e., the 1973-1975 time frame) of
the type that would be applicable in designing radiation-tolerant
equipment.
This lack of reported work may imply that no significant new in-
formation has become available since 1973; PRC is aware of a number of
in-depth reports published in the late 1960's, and these may still be
adequate.
With regard to how the Shuttle could most feasibly extend knowl-
edge in this area, PRC feels the distinction between collecting radia-
tion data for scientific purposes and for applications purposes should
be noted. There will doubtlessly be many experiments on the Shuttle
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program for collecting scientific information. PRC's experience has
been, however, that this type of data is not easily interpreted by the
engineer or technologist, and that often quite lengthy periods elapse
before this information becomes available in a form usable for applica-
tions purposes by the technologist. Thus, Shuttle experiments set up
specifically to collect data for applications purposes seems worthwhile.
It is not possible at this point to suggest implementations for
these experiments. They would depend heavily on extending the current
knowledge of radiation and its potential effects, and as indicated
above, PRC could not determine the status of this information during
this effort. It is certainly not feasible to attempt to collect data
over the multitude of spectral bandwidths, field intensities and oc-
currence profiles that characterize space radiation. The selection of
experiments would require careful analysis to select the most cost-
effective of the many candidates.
One possibility, suggested by the anomalies cited above where
on two occasions a shift in spacecraft potential occurred, concerns
in-space research on spacecraft charging. This phenomenon, where an
interaction between electric fields from the spacecraft and particle
motion causes current to circulate through the spacecraft, can create
spacecraft potentials as high as several kilovolts. Some feel that
this is responsible for many spurious commands and other anomalies.
References 44, 45, and 46 discuss spacecraft charging, the problems it
poses, and the need for more information.
15. Reaction Wheels
The PRC Space Data Bank contains 22 anomalies associated
with reaction wheels. On two spacecraft these resulted in severe atti-
tude instabilities, which, in turn, required considerable expenditure of
control gas for reacquisition under such emergency conditions as power
limitations due to incorrect array orientation and improper antenna
coverage. On another spacecraft, a momentum wheel anomaly caused com-
plete loss of attitude control through a complex chain of events
which began when a wheel control mag-amp shorted. On two other space-
craft, momentum wheel anomalies caused loss of pitch control.
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For those cases where the data bank contains information as to the
cause of the anomaly, bearing -lubrication problems are reported in two
cases, bearing temperature increases are reported in another two cases,
and brush wear on motors in another two cases. In addition, five anomalies
involve fluctuations in duty cycle, erratic wheel response, and motor
voltage abnormalities for which no specific cause is given.
Improved lubricants, as discussed in subsection 12, would pre-
vent some reaction wheel anomalies of the type contained in the data
base. In addition to the two lubrication problems cited above, some
bearing temperature problems as well as some other problems where no
specific cause is given, may involve lubricant deficiencies. An inter-
esting point, however, is that for at least half of the anomalies, the
underlying causes either were not, or could not, be determined. For
instance, two spacecraft developed a nutation due to some unspecified
cause having to do with the combination of wheel response and "lunar
conflict."
While some of the anomalies could undoubtedly have been prevented,
PRC feels that unpredictable interactions will always be possible due
to the difficulties in simulating realistic operational conditions. The
problem lies, as PRC sees it, not so much in the performance of bear-
ings and motors in 0-g—where they are subjected to less loading than
on the ground—but rather in the combination of torques which must be
reacted. The two cases of nutation resulting from the combination of
wheel response and "lunar conflict" are examples of this.
Therefore, PRC feels that evaluation via the Shuttle of momentum
wheel performance would be beneficial. This could be accomplished by
deploying an instrumented test package which could be both observed
and monitored automatically. Correlations between such factors as
energy inputs and system performance could be determined directly, as
could such aspects as response time, unloading characteristics, etc.
PRC feels that such evaluations will be especially desirable for
new momentum wheel approaches. As discussed in References 47 and 48,
magnetically suspended wheels now being developed utilize techniques
that eliminate the power consumption problems of an all-electromagnetic
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system. While Reference 47 reports that these wheel systems are immune
to environmental effects, PRC feels that the response to operational com-
binations of torques remains an area to be investigated.
Another new momentum wheel approach, as discussed in Reference 49,
utilizes hydrodynamic gas spin bearings that allow stopping and reversing
without bearing touch-down. As opposed to magnetic suspension, this
approach does require special considerations for testing in 1-g. Thus,
this fact as well as the torque combination effect cited above, seems
to PRC to warrant in-space evaluation.
16. RFI/EMI
The PRC Space Data Bank contains 50 anomalies attributed
to interference. Slightly more than half of of these are "nonequipment
specific," i.e., the source of the interference could not be isolated
to a specific equipment or the interference effected groups of equip-
ments rather than some specific equipment. By the same token, slightly
less than half the anomalies were "equipment-specific" in that either
the interference source or its effect involved identified, specific
equipment.
The nature of both categories of this interference run's the gamut
from cross-talk, noise, RFI, and EMI to "glitches." Some examples in-
clude one complex communications spacecraft which experienced six per-
sistent types of interference between the various equipments in its
communications system. At least two of these have resulted in restricted
operational regimes. On several spacecraft in one program, interference
with various equipments occurred during ignition of thrusting devices.
All of the spacecraft on this program were "noisy," or had other "noise"
problems of some sort. The spacecraft on two other programs have simi-
lar records of persistent noise problems.
The 50 anomalies in this RFI/EHI category are surpassed by only
four other anomaly categories established for this study effort. Yet
the literature search conducted as a part of this effort, while neces-
sarily brief, turned up no pertinent documents on this subject. There
are several possible reasons for this apparent lack of interest.
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The means for controlling or eliminating interference—i.e.,
grounding, shielding, filtering, etc.,—are sufficiently well understood
that they may be felt more fitting topics for textbooks than papers or
reports. Beyond this, many interference characteristics are so depen-
dent on a particular system configuration and its implementation that dis-
cussions of what worked well in one case might seemingly be of little
interest in another. Also, PRC feels that many accept interference
as a "fact of life," to be dealt with by adding a filter capacitor or
increasing the size of a grounding system.
Based on the number of anomalies in the interference category,
and, PRC feels, on the lack of attention, experimentation in this area
is recommended. While it is obvious that many benefits could accrue
from a ground-based program, problems with adequately simulating actual
operational conditions are well known. Anechoic chambers, thermal-
vacuum facilities, system test facilities, etc., all are capable of re-
vealing a number of interference problems but, as the record indicates,
not all of them.
The recommended in-space experimentation could be based on the
objective of determining and cataloging the characteristics of various
EMI/RFI suppression and protection approaches. The equipment could
utilize noise generating devices, and the response of various combina-
tions of approaches could be monitored. For instance, approaches under
test could be sequentially modified with respect to such details as
grounding bars vs. braids, different types of electrolytic capacitors,
different shielding materials, etc., for a wide range of configurations.
The test package could be deployed sufficiently distant from the Shuttle
to guarantee that any interference noted resulted from operation of the
test package or from environmental effects. With respect to this, in-
formation from Shuttle environmental monitoring devices would allow the
data to be correlated with respect to such factors as solar field strength
and radiation levels.
17. Semiconductors
Analysis of the PRC Space Data Bank reveals several semi-
conductor malfunctions which are indicative of an area that would probably
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benefit from in-space evaluation. The anomalies associated with these
malfunctions can be summarized as follows:
(1) Space radiation damage to transistors, possibly
ionization of the gases encapsulated in the tran-
sistors, caused complete failure of both command
decoders on one spacecraft.
(2) A high power regulator failed to turn-off on sev-
eral occasions, in one instance discharging the
battery and incapacitating the spacecraft. A dew
point problem in a power transistor was possibly
the cause of this anomaly.
(3) On two spacecraft on one program, "purple plague"
in integrated circuits caused loss of the computer
portion of the command and control unit.
(4) On one spacecraft, "ionic contamination" of inte-
grated circuit chips caused loss of a telemetry
channel. This anomaly was attributed to incomplete
removal of the ammonia cleaning solution residue,
thus creating polarity problems within the chip.
Of the anomalies summarized above, one occurred fairly early in
the space era, one occurred quite recently (1975), with the others oc-
curring in between. An especially interesting point is that with the
possible, exception of the transistor dew-point problem—for which the
PRC Space Data Bank contains no further information—all the other
anomalies involved semiconductors which did not have an extensive, in-
space operational record but had undergone a thorough and detailed
parts qualification program. While the causes of these anomalies could
have been eliminated on the ground, they are the kind that are almost
impossible to predict before actual operational data become available.
With the rapid proliferation of new types of semiconductor devices, an
experimental program to obtain such data on in-space device behavior
would be highly desirable.
In addition to the accelerating trend toward LSI (Large Scale
Integration) for digital applications, numerous new devices for commu-
nications and analog equipment are beginning to appear. These include
64
charge-coupled devices, gallium arsenide field effect transistors
(GaAsFET's), varactors, IMPATT diodes, Gunn diodes and silicon Schottky
barrier varistors. The fabrication of all these new devices is compli-
cated by the resolution required (for instance, distances and line widths
that are in microns) for the high packing densities.
This introduces many possibilities for potential operational prob-
lems of the types reflected by the above anomalies. From the choice of
fabrication materials and techniques to the inability to separate "failure
mode" from "failure mechanism," there are numerous ways in which unfore-
seeable device limitations can occur. While these can be corrected once
they are understood, it has often been the case that long periods in an
actual operational environment are required to provide the necessary
information.
Thus, it is recommended that new semiconductor devices such as
the ones mentioned above be operated in space for purposes of gaining ad-
vance information on their potential, inherent failure modes. These tests
should be conducted as nearly as possible to duplicate operational use
rate and length of service, factors which are difficult to duplicate on
the ground. This should include powered operation and cycling.
One approach would be to place test circuits incorporating new
devices in the LDEF, then retrieve these after various operational pe-'
riods, e.g., one month, two months, six months, one year. These circuits
could then be extensively inspected on the ground to detect impending
problems or signs of aging or degradation, and to evaluate the adequacy
of fabrication techniques. With such information available, any neces-
sary corrective actions could be implemented in a more timely manner.
18. Star Trackers
The PRC Space Data Bank contains 35 anomalies associated
with star trackers, the earliest occurring on a spacecraft launched in
1964, and the latest on one launched in 1974. The nature of these
anomalies can be summarized as follows:
(1) Twelve anomalies were attributed to mechanical prob-
lems, with "stuck gimballs" accounting for eight of
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these, a "stuck" sun shutter, for two, a "stuck
shutter" for another, and another reported as simply
"mechanical hangup."
(2) Three anomalies were attributed to improper calibration
or calibration problems.
(3) Degradation or aging are the reported causes of
three anomalies, with one of these being loss of
sensitivity due to aging, another gain degradation,
and the third degradation because the unit had ear-
lier been pushed beyond its design limits.
(4) For six anomalies, little detailed information is
given except for statements such as "lost star dur-
ing slews," failed to acquire guide star," drop in
reference voltage," "light leak through shutter," and
"noise bursts from tracker caused it to become
unusable."
(5) The remaining 11 anomalies involve tracking anomalies
and the capability of the tracker to remain locked-
on to the proper star. On three occasions, a tracker
locked-on to the wrong star, in one case due to the
scintillation from high energy particle radiation
'and albedo saturation recovery effects. Bright
particles, whose sources ranged from dust particles
from the spacecraft to sun reflections, caused four
anomalies. In one case, a star tracker acquired
earth stray light, in another a tracker "fov" was
occulted by an unknown object. The micropulses
within each star pulse caused improper operation
of the star-advance function in one tracker, and
another anomaly involved tracking jitter on bright
stars.
From the above anomaly summaries, it can be seen that the majority
of the star tracker anomalies are about equally divided between mechanical
problems and tracking problems involving imaging performance. While PRC
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feels these problems must have been recognized, neither the extent of the
recognition nor the corrective actions being taken was evident from the
literature search. In the three most applicable documents found, Refer-
ence 50 discusses a tracker that uses V-slits and measures the crossing
time of the trailing edge of each star against a time reference source.
It is reported that'this approach prevents acquisition of star clusters
and sensing of the moon or sun. Reference 51 describes a star sensor
for spacecraft with low spin rates which utilizes N-shaped slits to pro-
duce a photomultiplier tube output of three equal pulses for a given star.
The amplitudes of these signals are indicative of the'star's visual mag-
nitude, and it is reported that a star catalog will be compiled which
tabulates the sensor's response to each star. Reference 52 discusses a
rather radical departure from conventional star tracking techniques in
that it considers interferometric star tracking. This paper reports the
advantages of this approach and acknowledges that many problems remain
to be solved.
It seems to PRC that the ultimate objective in star tracker tech-
nology would be to develop approaches that precluded both mechanical and
imaging problems. While this does not appear feasible within the current
state-of-the-art, innovative approaches utilizing holographic techniques,
semiconductor imaging with something like charge-coupled devices, inter-
ferometry, etc., offer possibilities.
Considering the two types of problems separately, improved lubri-
cants, as discussed in subsection 12, could possibly eliminate some me-
chanical problems. For eliminating imaging problems, an approach that
should be feasible within the next few years would utilize a microproc-
essor and semiconductor memory for handling star-mapping algorithms.
This would, in essence, involve "voting logic" in that multiple sensor
heads, which need not have high accuracy requirements, could provide
information on constellations or groups of stars. In other words, this
approach would derive reference information, for instance, from the Big
Dipper, instead of simply Polaris.
PRC feels that all efforts toward star tracker improvement will
require evaluation via the Shuttle. For improvements that are feasible
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within the current state-of-the-art, information on star characteristics
taken outside the earth's atmosphere will be invaluable: This informa-
tion can be obtained from instruments mounted in the Shuttle payload bay
for measuring spectral characteristics. In addition, specific trackers
can be evaluated and calibrated in-orbit.
For improvements not currently within the state-of-the-art, it
can be expected that the Shuttle will play a vital role in prototype de-
velopment. In-orbit bench-tests, prototype qualification tests, etc.,
can be conducted via the Shuttle under actual operational conditions
which are difficult and costly to simulate.
19. Sun Sensors
The PRC Space Data Bank contains 25 sun sensor and solar
aspect detector anomalies. These can be summarized as follows:
(1) Five were due to human error, with two of these
involving wiring errors, one an incorrect gain
setting, one a manufacturing defect, and one in-
complete testing.
(2) No information beyond such statements as "malfunc-
tioned" or "failed" is given for six anomalies.
(3) Three anomalies were attributed to detector failures.
(4) A thermal problem caused one anomaly.
(5) Four anomalies involved "double sun pulses," "pre-
mature sun pulses" and "extra sun pulses."
(6) Earth albedo and earth stray light were responsible
for two anomalies.
(7) Radiation damage, and particularly ultraviolet
radiation, was responsible for four anomalies.
While the anomalies summarized above reveal no consistant trends,
PRC feels two underlying factors are exhibited. First, sun sensor and
even solar aspect sensors are the least complex of the attitude reference
sensors in that detecting the sun presents few problems. PRC feels that
for this reason they probably receive less attention during design and
fabrication (as evidenced in particular by item 1 above) than the more
complex sensors. Second, they possess several features that make realistic
test conditions difficult to simulate. This steins from three -requirements
that their detectors must meet, namely, they must be able to withstand the
radiation environment, they must reject luminance from sources other than
the sun, and they must have the capability of producing "nonconfusing"
sun signals. The anomalies summarized in items 5, 6, and 7, above, are
indicative of problems that can arise due to these three requirements.
While the possibility of such problems is undoubtedly recognized,
the literature search conducted during this study turned up nothing re-
lated to them. PRC feels that the anomaly record indicates that this
apparent lack of attention is not justified. Sun sensor performance,
particularly with regard to the three requirements cited above, should
be more thoroughly investigated. Since it is difficult to simulate op-
erational conditions realistically, PRC recommends that this be done via
the Shuttle.
One approach to this could utilize coarse and fine sun sensors
as well as solar aspect sensors mounted in the payload bay. Their per-
formance could then be monitored under a wide range of Shuttle orienta-
tions to provide such information as response characteristics under vary-
ing angles of incidence, the effect of seasonal or diurnal variations,
and the capacity to discriminate between solar radiation and other sources
of radiance. These evaluations could be performed for a number of radi-
ation-protection approaches which would utilize cover slides of several
different materials and thicknesses. To evaluate the potential for radi-
ation damage more extensively, test units could be placed in the LDEF.
20. Tape Recorders
The PRC Space Data Bank contains 94 tape recorder anomalies,
making them second only to scientific experiment packages in number of
anomalies, and also the most anomaly-prone specific type of equipment.
These tape recorder anomalies have run the gamut from broken or de-
graded tapes, failed tape drive motors, capstans and drive units, to
problems, malfunctions and failures in read/write circuitry.
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The problems associated with tape recorders are well known. A
joint AF/NASA Tape Recorder Action Committee (TRAP) was formed in early
1972 as a result of the interest that had been aroused .as to the ques-
tionable performance of tape recorders. Reference 53 describes this
committee and its findings and recommendations, including recommendations
for improvements in both hardware and management functions.
During the course of this study, PRC briefly evaluated three papers
on tape recorder state-of-the-art. Reference 54, which is a good tutorial
paper on high data-rate tape recorders, summarily admits that there are
reliability problems but concludes that they can be overcome. Reference
55 and 56 describe possible improvements in the mechanical portions of
tape recorders, and report that they would eliminate many potential
failure mechanisms.
PRC is not inclined to agree that tape recorder reliability can
be substantially improved nor that the improvements being recommended
will eliminate the most troublesome areas. In ground computer installa-
tions, magnetic tape units require rigorous preventative maintenance pro-
grams, including lubricating, alignment, etc., and even then they are
among the most troublesome equipments in the system. For space applica-
tions, it is difficult to imagine that long-life requirements can be met.
PRC feels that alternate memory approaches offer the ultimate so-
lution, but currently these still pose problems. Based on the record
revealed by the PRC Space Data Bank, alternate memory approaches ex-
perienced 23 anomalies. It is not always clear what types of memories
these were but it can be determined that at least two of these anomalies
involved ferrite core memories.
A basic problem with alternate memory approaches in the past has
been weight restrictions. In the typical range of 10 to 10 bits needed
for spacecraft data storage, the tape recorder has so far been the only
approach that could meet weight requirements. Hew developments in large-
scale integration, bubble memories, charge-coupled devices, and several
other approaches can be expected to change this situation.
Reference 57 describes a 0.5 megabit memory utilizing new ferrite
core techniques which was developed in Germany for the Helios space probe.
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Reference 58 discusses current trends in semiconductor memories, as do
References 30 and 31. Packing densities for currently available commer-
cial devices are about 4K bits per chip, except for charge-coupled devices
where densities of 16 kilobits per chip are reported. One hundred to 400
kilobit bubble memory chips have been built, and a 100 megabit one is ap-
parently being evaluated, but intensive funding is reported needed for
effective development and fabrication programs. Still further downstream
are optical data storage utilizing holography, as described in Reference
59, and electron beam/CRT approahces, as mentioned in Reference 58. Both
these approaches are reported to be capable of storing millions of bits.
For any of these devices that appear feasible alternatives to tape
recorder storage, PRC recommends, a three-phase program via the Shuttle
similar to the one recommended for computers (subsection 5, above). The
first phase should consist of evaluating the individual devices as semi-
conductors, as discussed in subsection 17. The second stage should con-
sist of in-space evaluation of a complete system, with emphasis on inter-
face stresses. That is, the system should be exercised with maximum
input and output data rates to evaluate stability, error rate, response
to worst case addressing patterns (which PRC expects to be a critical
area), and interactions at the memory/RF interfaces under actual operat-
ing conditions that can be expected to include fading arid distortion.
Following this, the recommended third phase would be deployment
of a test package, with revisits and eventual retrieval to evaluate
long-term performance.
21. Thermal Control
While the PRC Space Data Bank contains 16 anomalies re-
lated to thermal control, most of them appear to have been preventable
by techniques that were within the state-of-the-art at the time the ef-
fected spacecraft were designed. Of these 16 anomalies, only four oc-
curred to individual spacecraft without some form of repetition within
a program. That is, two spacecraft on one program each had a thermal
anomaly, four spacecraft on another program had one each, and so on
for a total of 12 anomalies. Almost all 16 anomalies involve temperature
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increases, high rates of temperature rise and excessive temperatures.
In one case, "hazardous spacecraft overheating" is reported, but most
of the anomalies did not jeopardize mission success.
Thus, in general, PRC feels the PRC Space Data Bank indicates
that thermal control design and implementation approaches are well in-
hand. Thermal coatings as well as materials such as aluminized mylar
and kapton are readily available and their properties appear to be well
understood. Two of the thermal anomalies, however, suggest that in some
cases in-space evaluation would be justified.
One of these two anomalies involves the flaking and outclassing
of a black coating, the other a sooner-than-predicted degradation of
thermal paints. For these two anomalies, it was reasonably clear that
the cause was the space environment; this may also be true for some of
the other anomalies where causes either were not or could not be
determined.
Based on the performance record of thermal control and the fact
that space environmental factors can cause degradation, PRC recommends
in-space evaluation for any thermal material or -coating which is a de-
parture from those that are currently well understood. Reference 60,
for instance, describes a new taminated coating that absorbs particulate
radiation at one laminar level and solar radiation at another. PRC feels
that in-space evaluation for such new approahces as this would provide
useful data that could not otherwise be obtained.
One approach to this experiment would be to place test patches
on the LDEF, then retrieve and analyze'them on the ground to determine
the extent of degradation. An extension of this "passive" approach to
the experiment would be to incorporate sensors beneath the test patches
to allow the monitoring of temperature data. This "active" approach
could be taken if either the nature of the material or coating was a
radical departure from that now available, or if the results from a
passive experiment indicated that more extensive information was
required.
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22. Uplink Problems
The PRC Space Data Bank contains 39 anomalies related to
problems with the command uplink. The reports on 25 of these anomalies
describe only symptoms, such as "drop-outs," "lost lock," "spacecraft
could not be contacted," and "commands not executed on first transmission."
In one case, failure of the command system to lock-on to the incoming sig-
nal caused loss of the spacecraft. In several cases, the ability to con-
tact the spacecraft was lost for unknown reasons, then after periods
ranging from several days to over a month, the spacecraft again responded
properly—for equally unknown reasons. All command systems in the data
base utilize redundant receivers, so it can be assumed that the mechanisms
causing such problems effected all of the spacecraft's receivers.
For the other 14 anomalies, more detailed information is available.
Two of these involve degraded receiver sensitivity, one a failed calibra-
tion oscillator, and one a failed receiver. Two anomalies were due to
the RF signal saturating the receiver, and in one case the receiver
locked-on to the payload clock. In one case, the receiver confirm sig-
nal shifted frequency, and in another a receiver shifted frequency. The
remaining five anomalies involve interference of various types.
In addition to the 39 anomalies related specifically to uplink
problems, there are 38 more "situations" involving spurious commands.
The word "situation" is emphasized here to distinguish between a condi-
tion where spurious commands occur, and the actual number of spurious
commands. On one spacecraft for instance, one spurious command situa-
tion is recorded in the data base, but it encompasses over 50 spurious
commands.
For most spurious command situations, little or no information is
available beyond that they somehow occurred. Several spacecraft constantly
performed some decoded action on commands intended for other spacecraft,
but the mechanism causing this as well as the other spurious command sit-
uations is usually not known. It is reasonable to assume that uplink
problems play some role, but other factors are also undoubtedly involved.
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PRC feels that an in-space investigation into this entire uplink
problem area is warranted. Little is presently known concerning the
causes for these problems, primarily because diagnosis on the ground is
restricted due to lack of information on the conditions existing at the
receiver. Hence, PRC feels that the objective of the recommended inves-
tigation should be to collect and catalog data that will provide a better
understanding of the nature of the problems. Since the problems are cur-
rently so poorly understood, further study would be required to deter-
mine the most promising investigation approach.
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V. ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY ' . . - - - , . - - , ._.
The effort conducted to analyze the economic feasibil'ity of the
recommended experimental programs was restricted to a level of detail
sufficient for initial decision-making purposes. The 22 experimental
areas were assumed to constitute a single reliability improvement pro-
gram, then evaluated to determine if, and under what conditions, this
single program would be cost effective. The unknowns involved are too
great at this point to attempt any analysis of individual experiment
areas or to undertake a more sophisticated cost-benefit analysis.
The time frame of this analysis is the Shuttle era defined herein to
extend from about 1981 to the year 2000. It is assumed that the proposed
•experimental program is accomplished very early in the Shuttle era and
that subsequent spacecraft benefit from the results of the experimental
program by immediately incorporating all indicated changes. Moderate
departures from this assumption are covered in the analysis by the range
established for the number of spacecraft launched in the Shuttle era.
A rather large number of mission models have been postulated for
the Shuttle era; for this exercise a range of from 20 to 40 satellites
per year is assumed. This is close to most mission models and is intended
to represent those space missions in the Shuttle era which are similar
to those contained in the PRC Space Data Bank. Thus, over the Shuttle
era, it is assumed that there will be 400-800 unmanned, individual space-
craft missions.
For the missions of the type considered to be most likely; i.e.,
relatively long-term, relatively complex spacecraft, the PRC Space Data
Bank indicates an average occurrence of about 7.5 anomalies per space-
craft mission. If those anomalies associated with launch and the first
120 hours of spacecraft life are eliminated, there yet remain six anoma-
lies per spacecraft over the average spacecraft life.
This translates immediately, of course, into 2400 to 4800 anomalies
to be anticipated from unmanned spacecraft in the Shuttle era if the
proposed experimental program is not implemented. This assumes that the
This data was developed from the analyses presented in Reference 1, where
the operational life cycle of over 100 spacecraft of the type under con-
sideration were developed in detail.
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frequency and types of anomalies which occur in the future are predicted
by those that have occurred in the past, an assumption which is borne out
by the analysis of Section III.
The cost of these anomalies is taken to be the sum of the cost of
lost data and the cost of added activities incurred as a result of their
occurrence. From Reference 1 (page B-8), the average availability of
successfully launched spacecraft with Shuttle assistance for the first
five days is 69.3 percent. .This corresponds to a data loss of 30.7
percent. Without further Shuttle assistance, this would be the percent-
age of data expected to be lost from the projected missions. The average
total cost of the spacecraft missions considered is about $58 x 10 .
Adding $5.25 x 10 (one-half the cost of a single Shuttle mission) for
launch costs gives a total of $63.25 x 10 per spacecraft mission. The
cost of lost data then, is in the range:
400 x $63.25 x 1Q6 x 0.307= $7.77 x 109
800 x $63.25 x 106 x 0.307 = 15.5 x 109
This assumes equal weight of spacecraft data early and late in the
mission and no escalation in average spacecraft cost. The assumption of
equal weight is reasonable as most Shuttle era missions can be character-
ized that way (e.g., communications and meteorological satellites rather
than experimental spacecraft). It is highly unlikely that there will be no
escalation in spacecraft cost, but the result of making this assumption
is conservative, i.e., it results in lower anomaly costs than would
otherwise be the case.
The cost of added activities is estimated by assuming no additional
Shuttle assistance to anomalous spacecraft, i.e., no repair missions.
The activities then are essentially those which occur now. Program
offices investigate and document the anomaly and establish procedures to
reduce its effect. The cost of this activity is assumed to be 10 percent
of all the operational costs which in turn are approximately 10 percent of
total spacecraft costs. This figure then, is in the range:
While repair missions are quite likely in at least some cases, analysis
of its economic impact is beyond the scope of this effort.
Aerospace Report No. ATR-72(723)-1, Integrated Operations/Payloads/Fleet
Analysis Final Report, Volume III: System Costs, August 1971, page 3-257;
also Mathematica Incorporated, Economic Analysis of New Space Transportation
Systems. May 1971, page 6-3.
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400 x $63.25 x 1Q6 x 0.10 x 0.10 = $2.53 x 108
800 x $63.25 x 1Q6 x 0.10 x 0.10 = $5.06 x 108
Total anomaly costs, assuming only a Shuttle launch and initial checkout
9 9then, are $8.0 x 10 for a 400 spacecraft Shuttle era and $16 x 10 for
an 800 mission period. When the anticipated number of anomalies is con-
sidered, this makes the cost per anomaly $3.33 x 10 .
The cost of the proposed experimental program is the cost of the
experimental hardware, its operation, and analysis of the results, plus
the cost of Shuttle/Spacelab/LDEF support. For the first cost category,
each experimental program is assumed to cost about as much as an Explorer-
class satellite, or 15 million dollars per experiment. This cost includes
the experiment's own data handling, power Supply for LDEF experiments,
power conditioning for Spacelab experiments, data analysis and operation.
Shuttle support cost is estimated under the assumption that the entire
experimental program could be carried out On three dedicated and appropri-
ately time-phased Shuttle missions. This is probably not optimum from
a scheduling viewpoint nor is it necessary. It does, however, provide
a means for roughly estimating Shuttle support costs. To these two
costs, 10 percent is added for integration, LDEF usage, and miscellaneous
costs. The total experimental program cost then, is given by:
1.10 J3($10.5 x 106)+ 22($15 x 106)| = $3.98 x 108
The savings to be anticipated from implementation of the program are
a function of the number of anomalies prevented. Since, as indicated in
Section IV, only 50 percent of the anomalies are being treated by this
program, that is the maximum proportion of anomalies which could be
eliminated. The number of anomalies to be eliminated is given by:
. 5N x E or,
N
where N = total number of anomalies anticipated without the
experimental program, and
E = efficiency of the experimental program.
An E of 90 percent means that 90 percent of the anomalies investigated
by the experimental program will be eliminated from future spacecraft.
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Under two assumptions of anomalies anticipated without the experimental
program and three levels of experimental program efficiency, the following
array of anomalies eliminated may be generated:
2400 4800
0.10
0.50
0.90
120
600
1,080
240
1,200
2,160
Program costs per anomaly prevented are shown in the following array:
E
.10
.50
.90
100
W
2400
$3.
$0.
$0.
$0.
32
66
37
33
X
X
X
X
10
10
10
10
6
6
6
6
$1.
$0.
$0.
$0.
4800
66
33
18
17
X
X
X
X
10
10
10
10
6
6
6
6
The impact of the experimental program is shown graphically in Exhibit
V-l. Without the program, there will be six anomalies per spacecraft, on
the average, each of which will cost about $3.3 million. This is repre-
sented by the horizontal line in Exhibit V-l. Implementation of the ex-
perimental program will result in the elimination of a certain number
of anomalies from the Shuttle era spacecraft, depending on the number of
spacecraft and the efficiency of the experimental program. From the tabu-
lation above, which shows anomalies eliminated for two assumptions of
program size and three levels of experimental program efficiency, it can
be seen that the larger the space program or the more efficient the exper-
imental program, the less the cost per anomaly eliminated. This is
EXHIBIT V-l - ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF RECOMMENDED EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAMS
4.0
oQ
oo
z
o
O
z
DC
Ol
Q.
O
O
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.1
COST PER ANOMALY INCURRED ($3.3 x 106)
400 SPACECRAFT PROGRAM
800 SPACECRAFT PROGRAM
COST PER ANOMALY ELIMINATED-
0.5
EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM EFFICIENCY
0.9
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represented by the two curves in Exhibit V-l. The program is justi-
fied wherever the horizontal line exceeds the curved line, i.e., for
any efficiency greater than 10 percent for a 400 spacecraft program,
and any experimental program efficiency greater than five percent for
an 800-spacecraft program.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
During this study, the anomalies contained in the PRC Space Data
Bank were evaluated via two approaches: (1) an anomaly by anomaly evalu-
ation; and (2) a spacecraft by spacecraft evaluation. The first approach
was not especially fruitful in that very few individual anomalies were
found which could specifically be impacted by an in-space program. The
second approach, however, was exceedingly fruitful in a number of ways.
In terms of the objectives of this study, two major conclusions
were obvious from the approach two analysis, i.e., (1) a large percentage
of the PRC Space Data Bank anomalies fall into 30 clearly defined problem
areas; and (2) these problem areas are persistent; each contains relatively
evenly distributed anomalies from the earliest spacecraft launches to the
most recent. The merging of the results of the approach one and two anal-
yses and the subsequent economic feasibility analysis led to the recom-
mendation of 22 in-space experimental programs. These programs, which are
both technically feasible and economically viable, involve in-space applied
research or technology evaluations, and could prevent a significant number
of anomalies on future spacecraft. These programs could be carried out
early in the Shuttle era to the distinct advantage of all space vehicles,
especially long-life, unmanned spacecraft. Reliability requirements for
these spacecraft are expected to become more severe in the future in order
that more complex, and worthwhile, missions may be accomplished.
Since all previous PRC Space Data Bank studies have had other specific
objectives, this is the first study that has considered the anomalies on a
spacecraft by spacecraft basis. Hence, some features of spacecraft relia-
bility that had been suspected before but which were unsupported by an ex-
plicit data analysis were noted. In addition to the clustering of anomalies
into the 30 problem area categories and their persistence, as indicated
above, this includes several other types of anomaly trends. For instance,
the analysis strongly suggests that particular types of spacecraft will
have a characteristic type of "anomaly profile. "
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It is almost inevitable that in a study of this type, some major
recommendations will be for more study, and PRC feels that the anomaly
trends observed during this study deserve more in-depth analysis. Speci-
fically, those that were not pursued since they were not pertinent to
this study should be examined more quantitatively. Also, the problem'areas
identified in this study should be defined in the kind of detail that is
readily usable during design considerations. For such purposes, it would
be desirable to assemble additional data on past spacecraft, then, using
the observed experience of the data bank, analyze the role of spacecraft
reliability in the Shuttle era. PRC believes that such an approach could
provide valuable information on the economic impact of differing levels
of required reliability.
Since this report has dealt at length with spacecraft anomalies,
PRC feels that a point is in order to prevent misinterpretation. While
numerous anomalies have occurred, and while some of them have been quite
serious, the overall success of the U.S. space program is unquestionable.
This fact was borne out in this study as it has been in previous data bank
studies. Nevertheless, even trivial anomalies have an economic impact, and
all have the potential for reducing mission effectiveness. It is from this
viewpoint, PRC believes, that feasible programs for preventing anomalies
should be based.
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APPENDIX A PRC SPACE DATA BANK UPDATE
I. SCOPE
The most recent update of the PRC Space Data Bank incorporated all
operational reliability, data from inflight spacecraft received by PRC
through the middle of calendar year 1972 with a few minor exceptions
1 2 3
noted in the report. The published data, ' ' together with supporting
source documents and working papers form the PRC Space Data Bank.
While the PRC Space Data Bank is considered to be adequate for the
purposes of this study, the desirability of extending the data base is
manifest. Thus, the excluded data from the last update have been
analyzed and included as part of the data base for this study. Since
these data are so sparse, however, it was also decided to include readily
available data from programs with established contacts and a record of
.cooperation. This has been done.
The programs mentioned in the most recent Space Data Bank publica-
tion include PIONEER, MARINER, ERTS (LANDSAT), and SOLRAD. Programs
from which additional data were sought are PIONEER, MARINER, ERTS (LAND-
SAT) , and ATS. The general results are given in Sections II through VI
of this appendix and a composite anomaly listing is given in Section VII.
It should be made clear that there are strong indications of ample
data available from other sources and more information could have been
Bean, E. E., and C.E. Bloomquist, Addendum to Reliability Data From
In-Flight Spacecraft; 1958-1970, PRC D-1864, PRC Systems Sciences
Company, November 1972 (AD906048L)
2
Bean, E.E., and C.E. Bloomquist, Reliability Data From In-Flight
Spacecraft; 1958-1970, PRC R-1453, Planning Research Corporation,
November 1971 (AD889943L)
Bean, E.E., and C.E. Bloomquist, Study of Reliability Data From
In-Flight Spacecraft, PRC R-948, Planning Research Corporation,
March 1967, (NASA CR-84628, Accession No. X67-17000)
derived from the programs mentioned. However, due to budget and schedule
constraints, update efforts were limited to the programs listed and,
furthermore, only data regarding anomalies were considered.
In this very restricted effort, 173 anomalies were,found which,
interestingly enough, do not appear to be significantly different from
a random sample of anomalies from the published PRC Space Data Bank. Thus,
not only is the anomaly data base increased by about 10 percent with anom-
alies occurring more recently than those in the most recent publication,
but the entire data base appears to be relatively homogeneous.
II. SOLRAD
i
The Naval Research Laboratory's SOLRAD (Solar Radiation) program
consists of eight successful satellites launched to make continuous
measurement of the sun's emission in the x-ray band. The PRC Space Data
Bank currently contains data on SOLRAD's 1, 8, and 9. No additional data
have been received on SOLRAD's 1 through 8. Data received but not included
in the PRC Space Data Bank publications indicate that SOLRAD 9 operated
an additional 10 months with no additional anomalies. Hence, this satellite
is not considered any further in this update.
SOLRAD 10 was not previously considered. Rather extensive data on
the configuration and intended mission of this satellite have been received
but essentially nothing on its operation. It was successfully launched
and operated for some indeterminate period of time; two experiment failures
were noted in the available documentation. Table I (General Data Elements)
of the PRC Space Data Bank standard engineering analysis report (EAR) is
included here as Exhibit Al. The anomalous behavior descriptions (Table
IV of the EAR) are incorporated into Exhibit A7 at the end of this appendix.
-. The significance of this satellite program update for the current
study is minimal; it is included for completeness rather than its contri-
bution. Additional data are surely available but the effort needed to
acquire such data was judged to be too great to be borne by this study
project.
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in the Space Data Bank.
Mission; SOLRAD 10
Launch Vehicle: Scout B
Launch Date: 8 July 1971
Orbit Parameters: 51.0 inclination, 620 kilometer
(340 nautical mile) apogee, 430
kilometer (235 nautical mile)
perigee, 95.3 minute period.
Mission Objectives:
Performance Evaluation:
To .make continuous measurements of
the sun's emission in the x-ray band.
None specifically available. It was
successfully launched and apparently
operated for a number of months. Two
experiment failures were noted within
four months which implies that the
other 12 operated successfully for at
least that period.
Sponsoring Agency: Naval Research Laboratory.
EXHIBIT Al - General Data Elements, SOLRAD 10
III. ATS
The spacecraft of the Applications Technology Satellite program
are designed to carry as a payload, a group of technological and scientific
experiments. The experiments can be divided into five groups according to
experimental emphasis: (1) communications, (2) meteorology, (3) space-
craft stabilization, (4) other technological experiments, and (5) environ-
mental measurement. The spacecraft are large and complex, and are usually
placed in stationary orbits. Six ATS spacecraft have been launched to date.
ATS-1 through 5 are included in the PRC Space Data Bank publications.
No additional data of any significance to this study have been obtained
on the first five spacecraft. A wealth of data has been obtained for ATS-6,
however, none of which was previously included in the data bank.
ATS-F before its launch, this sixth spacecraft in the ATS series carries
a number of applications experiments. It is stationed in synchronous orbit and
contains a wide range of communications equipment that can be command-con-
figured in numerous ways to assess techniques for aircraft tracking, spacecraft
tracking, television relay and so forth. A unique feature of ATS-6 is its
30-foot, space deployable, parabolic reflector antenna. To conduct its
various experiments, the spacecraft must maintain high-precision, three-
axis stabilization (to 0.1 degree). In addition to its experimental communica-
tion equipment, other experiments include an ion engine, interferometer,
environmental measurements package, and a radiometer.
The spacecraft was launched 30 May 1974, and as of 8 December 1975
was still operable. A number of anomalies have occurred but they have not
jeopardized mission success. Many of the anomalies are due to operational
problems stemming from the complexity of the spacecraft.
General data elements are given in Exhibit A2, and anomalous behavior
descriptions are compiled in Exhibit A7.
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Mission: ATS-6 (ATS-F)
Launch Vehicle: Titan III-C
Launch Date: 30 May 1974
Orbit Parameters: 42,160 kilometer synchronous orbit;
spacecraft can be restationed and has
been.
Mission Objectives: To demonstrate the feasibility of long
duration, precision pointing, three-
axis stabilized flight at synchronous
altitude for various applications and
scientific payloads. A successful
flight of a minimum of two years duration
is required.
Performance Evaluation: The spacecraft has been generally
successful in spite of a number of
anomalies but still has about 6 months
of operation to go to be called an un-
qualified success.
Sponsoring Agency/
Prime Contractor:
Goddard Space Flight Center/Fairchild-
Hiller.
EXHIBIT A2 - General Data Elements, ATS-6
IV. ERTS (LANDSAT)
The ERTS, or as it is now called, the LAWDSAT program, is a follow-
on to the NIMBUS program. Four IIIMBUS meteorological satellites were
orbited to develop the capability incorporated into ERTS-1 (now LANDSAT-1).
The ERTS program objective was to demonstrate the capability and usefulness
of remote sensing of conditions on the earth's surface on a global scale
and on a repetitive basis. Specifically, the ERTS program determined what
data can be gathered by unmanned spacecraft, how this data can be inter-
preted and applied to a diversity of endeavors, and how the information
yield can be of economic or social value to commercial, scientific, and
government interests. The spacecraft weighs nearly 900 kilograms (2000
pounds) with over 200 kilograms (440 pounds) devoted to sensors, communi-
cations, and related electronics equipment.
The earlier NIMBUS spacecraft are_included in the PRC Space Data
Bank and no new information was acquired in this update. ERTS-1 (LA1JDSAT-1)
information wa's acquired and the general data elements are included in
Exhibit A3. Anomalous behavior descriptions are compiled in Exhibit A7.
Preliminary information was received on LANDSAT-2 but was not analyzed due
to a lack of operating time on the spacecraft and the occurrence of signi-
ficant anomalies coupled with a lack of resources and time in this study
project.
While ERTS-1 was highly successful, there were quite a few anomalies,
and in several cases they could have considerably reduced mission success
had it riot been for redundancy and a good bit of luck. The early loss of
the return beam vidicon (one of 2 prime sensors) was mitigated by the fact
that the multispectral scanner (MSS) was collecting far better data than
expected. This piece of "luck" resulted in the MSS carrying out all ERTS
objectives. Redundant units switched include the s-band transmitter, the
rate measuring package, and the narrow band tape recorder.
References
1. ERTS-1 Flight Evaluation Reports: 735D4224, 27 February 1973;
735D4260, 10 August 1973; 735D4274, 28 November 1973; 745D4205, 26
February 1974; 745D4217, 18 May 1974; 745D4236, 15 August 1974; 745D4255,
31 December 1974; prepared by General Electric ERTS Operations Control
Center for the Goddard Space Flight Center.
2. LANDSAT-1 Flight Evaluation Report, 755D4222, 30 April 1975,
prepared by General Electric LANDSAT Operations Control Center for the
Goddard Space Flight Center.
3. LANDSAT-1 and LANDSAT-2 Evaluation Report, 755DS4228,
15 August 1975, prepared by General Electric LANDSAT Operations Control
Center for the Goddard Space Flight Center.
Mission: ERTS-1 (LANDSAT-1)
Launch Vehicle: Delta 900
Launch Date: 23 July 1972
Orbit Parameters: Near-polar, 900 kilometer (500 nautical
mile) circular orbit
Mission Objectives: To demonstrate the usefulness of remote
sensing of conditions on the Earth's
surface on a global scale and on a
repetitive basis
Performance Evaluation:
Sponsoring Agency/
Prime Contractor:
Data returned has surpassed all
expectations, both in volume and
quality. Some equipment problems
have been encountered but mission
objectives were met.
Goddard Space Flight Center/General
Electric
EXHIBIT A3 - General Data Elements for ERTS-1 (LANDSAT-1)
V. PIONEER
Three generations of Pioneer missions have thus far provided
information from interplanetary space. The first five Pioneer space probes
were launched on a variety of missions ranging from lunar to deep space
exploration; the first was launched in 1958 and the last in 1960.
Due to sparsity of data none of these spacecraft are included in the PRC
Space Data Bank.
The second generation of Pioneers all orbit the Sun and are
designed to return data on fields and particles of the solar wind and
plasma particles originating from the Sun and the galaxy. In addition
they map the magnetic field of outer space. This generation includes
Pioneers 6 through 9 and one unsuccessful launch (Pioneer E). Data are
included in the PRC Space Data Bank on these spacecraft. Launch dates
range from December 1965 through August 1969; Data Bank coverage
currently extends through 15 September 1970. While ample evidence
has been received of continued operation of these spacecraft very little
is available regarding anomalistic behavior. Some of this is due to the
minimal Deep Space Network (DSM) coverage resulting from the DSN response
to more pressing needs including Pioneers 10 and 11. Evidence has been
received of successful operation of all four spacecraft for at least two
years beyond that recorded in the published PRC Space Data Bank and in
December 1975, Pioneer 6 completed ten years in orbit with all subsystems
except the magnetometer operating well. However, since no further signi-
ficant anomaly data are available no further effort to update the data
bank with respect to these spacecraft has been made.
Pioneers 10 and 11 constitute the third generation. The objectives
of these spacecraft are to conduct exploratory investigations beyond the
orbit of Mars of the interplanetary medium, the nature of the asteroid
belt and the environmental and atmospheric characteristics of the planet
Jupiter. Pioneer 10 was launched 2 March 1972 and Pioneer' 11 was launched
5 April 1973. Both spacecraft have encountered Jupiter and continue to
operate on extended missions, Pioneer 10 to eventually leave the solar
system and Pioneer 11 to encounter Saturn. The previously published PRC
Space Data Bank contains no data on these spacecraft. Exhibits A4 and A5
provide the general data elements for Pioneers 10 and 11. Exhibit 7 com-
piles the anomalous behavior descriptions for both spacecraft.
References
1. Letter PAS-2-59(244-8) from Charles F. Hall, Pioneer Project
Manager to Eloise E. Bean, Planning Research Corporation,dated 13 October
1972.
2. Pioneer Document P-201, Pioneer F/G Technical Plan, 30 June
1970.
3. "Anomalies Packages for Pioneers 10 and 11" transmitted by letter
RQ:244-5/191-75 from F. F. DeMuth, Ames Research Center to C. E. Bloomquist,
PRC Systems Sciences Company, dated 4 December 1975.
Mission: Pioneer 10
Launch Vehicle: Atlas SLV.-3C/Centaur D/TE-364-4
Launch Date: March 3, 1972 (01:49 GMT)
Orbit Parameters: Jupiter Flyby
1st Midcourse maneuver day 6
2nd Midcourse maneuver day 21
Jupiter encounter - 12/3/73
Mission Objectives: 1) To conduct exploratory investigations
beyond the orbit of Mars, 2) to
investigate the nature of the asteroid
belt, and 3) to investigate the
environmental and atmospheric
characteristics of Jupiter.
Performance Evaluation: Highly successful.
Sponsoring Agency: Ames Research Center
EXHIBIT A4 - General Data Elements, Pioneer 10
Mission: Pioneer 11 (G)
Launch Vehicle: Atlas Centaur TE 364-4
Launch Date: April 6, 1973 (02:11 GMT)
Orbit Parameters: Jupiter Flyby
1) Transit thru asteroid belt:
~9/10/73 - 10/10/73
2) Passed bow shock of Jupiter
without incident: 11/26/74
3) Jupiter encounter phase:
2/25/74 - 1/3/75
4) Periapsis: 12/3/74
Mission Objectives: 1) To conduct exploratory
investigations beyond the
orbit of Mars, 2) to
investigate the environmental
and atmospheric characteristics
of Jupiter.
Performance Evaluation: Highly successful.
Sponsoring Agency: Ames Research Center
EXHIBIT A5 - General Data Elements, Pioneer 11
VI. MARINER
The ten spacecraft of the JPL Mariner series (with the exception
of three launch failures) have all been quite successful and have contri-
buted a great deal of highly significant data toward the understanding of
our solar system. There have been four successful missions to Mars, two
to Venus, and the highly productive Mariner Venus/Mercury launched in 1973,
also referred to as Mariner 10. Mariners 1 through 7 are included in the
PRC Space Data Bank publications. There are no further data from these
spacecraft and no details on the Mariner 8 launch failure or the Mars or-
biter, Mariner 9. Data on Mariner 10, however, are available from Reference
1 and are incorporated in this update.
The spacecraft design was derived from the JPL Mariner series, with
some new subsystems and special modifications added as required by its
sunward trajectory. The spacecraft's TV cameras took the first pictures
of both Venus and Mercury. The mission was the first multiplanet mission
and the first to use a gravity-assist technique.
The Mariner 10 scientific instrument complement was selected with
the primary objective of conducting an exploratory investigation of Mercury.
A brief description of the experiments follows:
(1) A dual fluxgate magnetometer, mounted on a 6-m boom,
measured magnetic fields.
(2) A plasma science instrument measured energy and
directional spectra of solar wind protons and
electrons.
(3) A charged-particle telescope measured high-energy
ions and electrons.
(4) Two extreme ultraviolet spectrometers (occultation
spectrometer and airglow spectrometer) measured
pressure and composition of the Flermian atmosphere.
(5) A body-mounted infrared radiometer measured surface
thermal properties.
(6) Television cameras provided high-resolution imaging
at long slant range.
The spacecraft was launched 3 November 1973 and operated in space
continuously for over 16 months, including two complete orbits of the sun
and three encounters with Mercury. Mariner 10 used the last of its attitude
control gas supply at approximately 11:25 GMT on March 24, 1975, and the
spacecraft transmitter was turned off for the last time.
General data elements are given in Exhibit A6 and the anomalous
behavior descriptions are incorporated in Exhibit A7.
Reference
1. Paul, Floyd A., A Study of Mariner 10 Flight Experiences
and Some Flight Piece Part Failure Rate Computations, Technical Memorandum
33-759, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, January 15, 1976.
Mission: Mariner 10 (Mariner Venus/Mercury 1973)
Launch Vehicle: Atlas/Centaur
Launch Date: 3 November 1973
Orbital Parameters: Venus flyby using a gravity assist into
a solar orbit encounter with Mercury
Mission Objectives: 1) To conduct exploratory investigations
of the planet Mercury's environment,
atmosphere, surface, and body char-
acteristics during the 1973 Mercury
opportunity.
2) To obtain environmental and atmos-
pheric data from Venus during the
flyby of Venus, to perform inter-
planetary experiments while the space-
craft is enroute from Earth to Mercury,
and to obtain experience with a dual-
planet, gravity-assist mission.
Performance Evaluation: The spacecraft was highly successful in
spite of a number of anomalies and fully
achieved both mission objectives.
Sponsoring Agency/Prime
Contractor:
Jet Propulsion Laboratory/Boeing
Aerospace Company
EXHIBIT A6 - General Data Elements, Mariner 10
VII.- ANOMALY LISTING
The 173 anomalies experienced by the six spacecraft included in this
update of the PRC Space Data Bank are listed in the following pages as
Exhibit A7. While PRC usually codes anomalies in order of time-of-occurrence
for published data base material, this coding was not necessary for the
analyses conducted during this study and would have been a superfluous step.
Therefore, the anomalies listed in Exhibit A7 have simply been randomized
in a manner that masks the identity of the spacecraft.
Identification
Time to
Failure Consequences Comments
TV he.iters failed to cycle
through positions. Most
likely cause is leakage
path from heater circuit-
raw dc power line to chassis
biasing off FDS MOSFETs that
control TV optics heater.
Optics heater came on
1-17-71 when direct command
DC-64 sent.
MAG temperature at -54 C
<-66°F), ll.l°c (20°F)
lower than predicted.
lleator function verified
by manual command. Not a
thermal anomaly; interpre-
tation problem.
Functional redundancy provided "work-around. PFR5001.
No effect on mission. PFR5002. MAG=Magnetometer.
3. Comstor B, cell 12 verified
with a 256 second change in
the required execute time.
4. Orbit adjust subsystem
firing gave 60% of
computed thrust.
5. Power output of the "A"
S-banrt xmitter has
dropped to 0.6 watts
(was 1.6 watts at launch).
Orbit 583
Orbit 38
Orbit 2600
(began at orbit
808)
Has occurred 13 times; each time a second
try verified correctly.
Trivial; has been fired 5 times and all
longer burns produced very near computed
thrust.
Insignificant,'system performance still
exceeds link margin requirements. If
decline continues, would eventually have
to use other xmitter.
Cause unknown, see item «87.
See item S89, S147.
EXHIBIT A7 - ANOMALOUS BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTIONS
Identification
Time to
Failure Consequences Comments
6. Missing thruster pulses as
indicated by TLM.
7. Separation switch started
sequencer 99 seconds early.
8. Battery temp. 13 F higher
than expected.
During
1st 6
days
Post
injection
Day 1
No effect. 33 out of 192 pulse counts were
missed during initial reorientation, conscans,
and the first midcourse maneuver. Doppler
measurements of s/c response to thrusting
commands indicate that the pulses were not
actually missed.
Switch W.IK npp.irontly .ict.iv.itod during or at
end of 3rd st.icji; burn, rather th.in at separation.
No adverse effect bocausi.- sequencer time margins
were designed to be grcMt enough to accommodate
such an event.
No effect, s/c put in more thermally benign
attitude for several weeks.
Thrusters were precession pair #2.
Anomaly attributed to erratic thruster
pressure switch, which is used only for
assessment of firing, not for control.
Some references say 90 seconds earlyj
apparently a typo. The sequencer is the
CDU sequencer.
Attributed to lapse in testing procedure.
9. RGA 81 roll gyro null high Day 13
during initial earth
acquisition.
10. Solar array shunt tap Day 14
voltage high.
11. Daily transient in DOC pitch Day 15
attitude command.
12. Noise cross-coupling in Day 19
L-band PLACE.
RGA ftl roll gyro null error is -0.15 /sec; RGA ft 2
used to complete initial earth acquisition and
subsequent acquisitions.
Shunt tap voltage indicates high only at certain
times during summer solstice. No other indications
of anomalous behavior of array or power conditioning
system have been observed.
Problem due to programming error;
by re-programming DOC in flight.
was eliminated
Not considered flight anomaly: condition was
noted and accepted prior to launch. No significant
impact on operations.
FAR 102 Component anomaly.
FAR 401 and 402 Not verified.
FAR 105
FAR 302 Communications problem.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
Identification
13. One of two identical,
independent ionization
chambers sensitive to
the 8 to 16 Angstrom
band of the x-ray spec-
trura ceased its detection
function for an unknown
cause.
14. Lyman-Mpha Flare Detector
fa i led .
Time to
Failure Consequences
(Within two
months of
launch)
(Within one
month of
launch)
None, due to redundancy.
Loss of anticipated data.
Comments
Identical to similar chamber on previous
spacecraft which continued to operate
48 months after launch. Reference 1,
Page 7.
Reference 1, Page 8.
15. IPP solar diffuser was
~65% as bright as the
calibration lamp.
16". Sensitivity of the 4 IPP
channeltron detectors
not well balanced.
Day 335 Apparently the diffuser results are nominal
but this could have some impact on measurements
near a 10 sun-look angle.
Assumed Apparently not significant. Channel 2 (Red?)
subsequent about twice as sensitive as channel 1 (blue?),
to day 335 depending somewhat on color and polarization
of object being observed. For Mode 4 images
of Jupiter, red signal will be twice the blue
signal, precluding use of the automatic gain
decrement function for maintaining optimum gain
settings.
Solar diffuser 1st looked at on day 335,
thus revealing this and anomaly #65.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
Identification
Time to
Failure Conseouences Comments
17. C-band xmitter power drop. Day 4
18. Occasional loss of YIRU Day 8
Rate Bias.
19. EME-U. of N. llamp. exp. Day 9
failure (and others).
20. MMW 20 GHz HI TWTA failure. Day 13
21. Inteferometer IFZ operates Day 13
intermittently.
Minimized/eliminated by use of the 6db attenuator
in the driver ckt. w/ no adverse effects on s/c
or experiment operations.
Would effect yaw control accuracy in offset point-
ing maneuvers; however, YIRU is in stand-by back-
up mode and PSA is used for yaw control.
Initial turn-on of the U. of N. llamp. exp. caused
permanent malfunction in the 64 level word #189;
affected all' EME housekeeping data.
All attempts to turn on the millimeter wave
20 GHz horn-TWTA in flight have failed. The
2nd 20 GHz TWTA operates properly.
Periodically observed by ground stations.
(FAR #301) component anomaly.
FAR 103 Component anomaly.
FAR 710, Refers to FAR 710-A-G for other
EME anomalies; not clear that PRC has
those FAR's. GFE experiment anomaly.
FAR 709 GFE experiment anomaly.
IF-2 initially operated intermittently, subsequently FAR 101 Component anomaly.
failed. F-l channel can be used for interferometer
operations.
22. PSE scan package temperature
5.5°C (10 F) below specifi-
cation limit. PSE temperature
was low because PSE not on
early in mission and combina-
tion of supplemental heater
size, test errors, and lower
unregulated do supply voltage.
No corrective action.
No effect on mission. PFR5003. PSE=Plasma Science Experiment.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
Identification
Time to
Failure Consequences Comments
23. Power transient in WB Video
Tape Recorder K2.
Orbit 148
24. Return Beam Vidicon failed to Orbit 196
respond to "off" command.
25. Array degradation .slightly During 1st
higher than projected. 3 months
26. Battery temperature spread During 1st
increased. 3 months
Disabled the unit-used 2nd unit.
RBV commanded "off" by alternate commands.
Since then, mission has been performed with
the Multi-Spectral Scanner.
Insignificant, power requirements can be
mot.
Insignificant, battery performance good.
Spread apparently later returned to
nominal.
Attributed to short between T2 transformer
taps in WBVTH dc-dc converter.
Problem believed to be associated with
relay system that feeds power to the RBV.
Possibility of degradation due to solar
flares.
27. Perturbations due to sun During 1st
glint in the IR horizon 3 months
scanners.
Not disruptive enough to necessitate single
scanner mode.
28. More thruster spin
coupling than expected.
29. Thruster temperature
sensor erratic. Day 1
No significant mission effect. Apparently due
to 1 thruster having~1.5° offset in its thrust
axis.
Problem apparently in sensor, so no mission
effect.
Similar occurrence on subsequent
spacecraft leads to conclusion that
plume reflection is responsible, a
design error.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
Identification
Time to
Failure Consequences Comments
30. Synthesizer interferes with Day 19
RFI experiment.
31. c-band ECH/PFF receive Day 20
coupling.
32. MET negative power spikes. nay 20
is.
Not considered rugnt anomaly since conaiuion
was known before launch. RFI experiment detects
synthesizer output; problem avoided by turn'""
synthesizer off during RFI experiment opera
Isolation between the Earth Coverage Horn and
the Prime Focus Feed, provided by C-band receive
switch, less than anticipated. Additional
isolation when req'd. (such as when receiving
on ECU while pointing to transmitting station)
is provided by PFF polarization switch.
Not considered flight anomaly as condition
could not be verified between Rosman and IDA.
No subsequent power drops observed.
FAR 303 Communications problem.
FAR 304 Communications problem.
FAR 702 Not verified.
33. TOT amplifier showed erratic Day 37
drops in output power of
several db, lasting for
several hours.
34. Imaging photopolarimeter Day 2
(IPP) calibration lamp
values low by~10».
Redundant unit switched-in.
Not significant; due to pressure change on the
high voltage power supply (was Mode 3 calibration
lamp).
No further information given.
It is not clear how many of these IPP
anomalies (i.e., S15, #16, #34, S35,
#63, #64, 865) are cause and effect.
They appear very related.
35. ipp Aperture anomalies
in a few rolls of data.
~ Day 60 to Not significant; The "phosphor source" position
Day 150 came into place once every few hundred rolls of
Mode 3 data. Occurred during the summer of '73,
with no subsequent reoccurrence.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
Identification
Time to
Failure Consequences Comments
36. Tracker temperature below
specification limit of -6.6 C
(20 F) . Tracker temperature
was low because it dissipates
less power when star is ac-
quired than in viewing dark
field.
37. Tracker failed to acquire
Vega in brightness gate 2.
Vega acquisition missed due
to I'.esensitization of tracker
by exposure to F.arth. Re-
covery completed within 24
h and is operating satis-
factorily.
No performance effect, temperature only 1.1 C
(2 F) below limit.
PFR5004. Star tracker anomaly.
No effect on mission. PFR5005. Star tracker anomaly.
38. Solar Array A5 temp,
sensor failure.
39. Noisy video pictures on
HET.
40.' Erroneous DOC PSA
roll off-set command.
41. L-Band negative power
spikes.
42. L-Band xmitter noise in
absence of an up-link
carrier.
Day 22
Day 22
Day 23
Day 23
Day 29
Sensor failed-open; has not impacted flight
operations.
Not considered flight anomaly; due to polarity
reversal in HET ground antenna feeds. Performance
excellent after field re-work.
Problem could not. be duplicated, nor has it
recurred.
Not considered flight anomaly; due to ground
station adjustments .
Not considered flight anomaly; condition known
and accepted prior to launch. No significant
effect on operations.
FAR 403 Component anomaly.
FAR 701 Ground problem.
FAR 106 Not verified.
FAR 305 Ground problem.
FAR 306 Communications problem.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
Identification
Time to
Failure Consequences Comments
43. MSS - steady decrease of Thru 1st
the calibration-wedge 1200 orbits
levels in Bands 1 and 2.
44. Data collection system During 1st
experienced several 3 months
periods of external
interference and one
9-dny period of fewer
than expected messages
received.
Not significant. Trend haa been reversed
to a slight rise.
Insignificant, always returned to normal.
These cal-wedges used to compute
signal to noise ratios.
Possibly due to external interference.
45. ACS gating frequency
greater than expected.
During 1st
3 months.
Insignificant, later leveled off and only
60* of impulse available at launch has
been used.
Long term correlation with seasons and
0 angle, and short term correlation with
payload operation. Phenomenon being studied.
46. Camera temperatures exceeded
lower specification limit of
-1S°C (5°F), due to TV heaters
not functioning. TV heaters
came on 1-12-74 and camera
temperatures returned to
normal.
Day 2 Caused by anomaly #1. Apparently no mission
effect.
PFR5006.
47. Scanning electrostatic
analyzer (SEA) ion and
electron counts too low.
Possible failure modes
were: (1) SEA aperture
door failed to open, (2)
SEA analyzer plates damaged
during launch, and (3) com-
ponent or solder failure in
SEA electronics. Cause
unknown.
Day 3 Cited as "significant problem" - not clear what
this implies.
PFR5007. Experiment package anomaly (PSE) .
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
Identification
Time to
Failure Consequences Comments
48. Incorrect scan clock and
cone commands reversed scan
platform operations program
(SPOP). All CC-6 coded
commands to be run through
SPOP and command generation.
49. Scanning electron spec-
trometer (SES) channel A
has 1881 counts added to
all data. Problem had
cleared when channel A
checked on 12-20-73. SES
is sensitive to 2.4-kHz
rise time and may have
cleared due to slight
change in rise time.
Day 9
A systems prpble'm; apparently no effect on mission. PFR5008.
No effect on mission. PFR5009. Experiment package anomaly (PSE).
50. Ion Engine #2 Turn-on
failure.
51. Solar Array A3 Temp,
sensor failure.
52. SPS-2 Primary Valve
heaters not functioning •
53. L-band/C-band cross
talk.
Day 50
Day 60
Day 62
Day 63
After highly successful operation following
initial turn-on, engine failed to turn-on, or,
turned off automatically on all subsequent
attempts.
Same type failure as #33.
Heaters inoperative duo to ckt. malfunction;
back-up heaters now used.
During C x L and L x C PLACE test, modulation
observed on C-band downlink in the absence
of an uplink L-band signal due to noise in
the system. Not considered flight anomaly.
See item 012.
FAR 707 GFE experiment anomaly.
FAR 404 Component anomaly.
FAR 001 Component anomaly.
FAR 310 Communications problem.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
Identification
Time to
Failure Consequences Comments
54. Radiometer (VHRR)
turn-on failure.
55. C-band oscillations.
56. ACS loss of control using
C-band monopulse as roll/
pitch sensor.
57. Radio beacon interferes
w/ S and C return link for
T and DR Exp.
Day 29
Day 33
Day 43
Day 47
Initially, the VHRR scan start was intermittent FAR 703 GFE experiment anomaly,
and tended not to start at housing temps, below 20 c.
On 8/15/74, chopper motor failed; exp. has not
operated since then.
Not a flight anomaly: due to faulty ground
instrumentation.
Due to procedural difficulties; subsequent
operations on C-band monopulse were satisfactory.
Problem avoided operationally by turning off
Radio Beacon during T and DRE (Tracking and
Data Relay Exp.) operations involving s-band x
c-band link.
FAR 307 Ground problem.
FAR 107 Ground problem.
FAR 308 Communications problem.
58. Slight increase in yaw. Orbit 1870
motor drive duty cycle.
59. Small excursion of roll Orbit 1890
drive duty cycle.
60. Pitch drive duty cycle Orbit 2150
increased sharply.
61. WPA SI came on with Orbit 1890
lowered power output-
62. Thermal anomaly of right Orbit 4
fwd. sun sensor.
Lasted for several days - minor. Settled
back near Orbit 3500
Minor-returned to normal after several
orbits.
Returned to normal after 15 orbits;
Had been off since orbit 196; when turned
on again, its power was down by 0.3db.
Finally increased so that after 200 orbits
was back to post-launch value. WPA 2 has
remained essentially constant.
No further information given except temperature
high.
Being investigated; anomalies still
occur occasionally for short periods
(thru orbit 7651). The one in pitch
became more sustained. ~ 12/20/73.
EXHIBIT A7 - .(Continued)
Identification
63.
64.
Occasional uncommanded
gain decrements in the
IPP.
IPP channeltrons show
a momentary surge in
sensitivity at the
instant of a gain
increment.
Time to
Failure
Over the
1st year of
operation.
Over the
1st year of
operation
Consequences , Comments
Not significant. They appear unpredictably once
every few hours, mostly at the high gains.
Apparently a disabling command is available
to by-pass this fault during Jupiter fly-by.
Not significant. Causes elevated signal levels
for~0.5 seconds (i.e., in 3 sectors of
Mode 3 data) .
65. 2 IPP channeltron outputs
dropped to zero for several
seconds shortly after a
gain decrement command.
Day 335 Not significant. Occurred only once (in
channels 2 and 3). Reason unknown.
66.
67.
Bright particle caused Day 10
los's of Canopus lock.
Particle tracked in plus
direction and lost. Roll
search to Canopus inhibited
by setting of roll search
inhibit logic in the atti-
tude control electronics.
Corrective action is to send
DC-21 to allow roll search.
Attitude control N gas usage Day 17
higher than expected. 9.07 g/
day (20 mlb/day) initial esti-
mate was based on insufficient
data. Cruise usage was actually
about 4.54 g/day (10 mlb/day)
per prelaunch predicts.
No mission effect. PFR5010.
No mission effect. PFR5011.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
Identification
Time to
Failure Consequences Comments
68. Camera A cathode current
low at turn-on. Degra-
dation probably due to
leaving TVS power on due
to TV heaters not coming
on. Diagnostic tests run
and vidicon beams off in
Earth-Venus cruise. TVS
power off in Mercury
cruise.
Day 13 Caused by anomaly #1; apparently no mission
effect:
PFR5012.
69. Solar Paddle temp,
excursions greater
than expected.
70. Slow leak in FWD IR
scanner pressure.
71. Same as S90, except
left cosine pot.
72. RMP output several times
its normal value to
several minutes near the
s/c day-night transition.
Orbit 4 No further details available.
~Orbit 3660 Not expected to interfere with normal operations. Leak rate is very slow.
(4/8/73)
~Orbit 4250
(5/20/73)
Orbit 7210
Same as #90.
Caused by unexplained energy input; signal
returned to normal by Orbit 7235. Apparently
occurred with both RHP 1 and 2.
RMP= Rate Measuring Package.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
Identification
Time to
Failure Co nscquences Comments
73. Slow battery discharge when
it is supposed to be
floating.
74. Failed battery cell
(short circuited).
75. One sun sensor channel has
double sun pulse.
76. Star sensor misses more star
pulses than it should.
Day 31
Day 75
to
Day 102
Day 52
~ Day 60
Mo effect since alternate modes of operation
maintain battery in charged condition.
Attributed to design error.
First referred to as battery voltage anomaly,
then analytically diagnosed as battery cell
progressively failing-short. No effect,
since battery could perform its function
even with 2 failed colls.
Occurs over a very limited combination of
sun-angles and sun distance. No effect on
mission-there is redundant unit.
Attributed to calibration procedure error.
Problem can be overcome by using sun sensor
instead of the non-redundant star sensor.
I
The relation between these is not clear.
The ref. for anomaly #74 says the discharge
current while floating was really 0
(telemetry said 0.245 Amp), and goes
on to describe analysis leading to con-
clusion of failed cell. Also concludes
that battery thermal history not responsible
for failure.
No further information given.
77. FDS power-on-resot (TOR)
when gyros turned on by
command 7M1, pre-roll
control maneuver. Another
POR on day 341. Probable
causes are random combin-
ation of normal 2.4-kHz
bus dip at gyro turn-on
and converted common
mode noise in FDS. Pre-
cautions and contingencies
now used.
78. No platform telemetry
response to 2 of 8 CC-6
commands. Reference
anomaly #105 for corrective
action.
Day 18
Day 23
Functional redundancy provided "work around,"
would have otherwise been serious.
Anomaly in Articulation and Pointing System;
apparently no mission effect.
PFR5013. FDS=Flight Data System.
PFR5014.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
Identification
Time to
Failure Consequences Comments
79. RTG boom deployment
incomplete.
80. Power Subsystem Anomaly.
81. (lore thruster spin coupling
than expected.
Post-launch Spin rnte changes indicated that one pair
of RTG booms stopped deploying when only
partially deployed. Full deployment
occurred spontaneously 6 hours later before
any corrective actions were attempted.
Post-launch Apparently, no mission effect. First
revealed by a telemetry measurement of
relative power system performance - some kind
of figure-of-merit indication that considers
bus current and RPG current. Other telemetry
data later revealed similar condition, viz,
that power margin was lower than predicted.
Post-launch Also occurred on previous spacecraft. No signi-
ficant effect. Plume reflection (a design error)
causes an offset of ~1.5 in 1 thruster axis.
One would have to know the s/c intimately
to be able to interpret the reports on
this. ;
82. C-band downlink power
drop-out during SAPPSAC/
Interferometer test.
83. Battery temperatures
higher than desired.
84. EME-UCSD experiment
scanning sensor head
mechanically bound.
85. HET-2 driver turn-off
intermittent.
Day 82
Day 126
Day 128
Day 132
Due to saturation of the RFI transponder by
interferometer c-band up-link (Rosman pointing)
which suppressed the signal being monitored
by the ground station. Attributed to procedural
error.
Batt. temps 31 c during winter solstice. Con-
dition avoided operationally by use at c/60
charge rate, reduction of shunt dissipation,
and restriction of Millimeter Wave and S/C
pointing for 2 hours/night during winter
solstice.
Experiment is 40% inoperative.
Driver off-relay tends to hang-up in "on"
position. Problem avoided operationally by
disconnecting the up-converter, then turning
off the HET xmitter to turn HET off.
FAR 315 Communications problem.
FAR 601 Note: Charged to thermal
control subsystem.
FAR 711 GFE experiment anomaly.
FAR 316 Component anomaly.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
Identification
Time to
Failure Consequences Comments
86. Abnormally high minor
frame sync error counts
in WBVTR-1 data.
87. Comstor B-cell 12 -
See S3.
88. Integrated ckt. chip in TMP
failed.
89. Decreasing power output
from the "A" s-band
xmitter (See items it5 and 3147) .
90. ACS - right cosine pot has
developed consistent-
signal deviation at s/c -
midnight.
Orbit 3463
~ Orbit 4523
Orbit 4396
Orbit 3574
Sometime
between Orbits
3810 and 5100
Operations continue on restricted sections
of the tape, and error counts have greatly
diminished.
Problem has now occurred on 23 occasions;
use of cell for active commands discontinued.
A telemetry channel disabled; s/c operation
not effected.
Output power now 0.29 watts. Still adequate
to perform required functions.
Degrades signal output but does not inter-
fere with s/c operation.
Returned to normal by orbit 4650, possibly
due to tape damage; later experienced
anomaly several more times. See item
#146.
Showed decreasing decline from orbits
5100 to 6370.
Part of SAO; attributed to internal
debris.
91. X-Band Transmitter (XTX)
output power drop from
96 to 90 data numbers
(ON) . Several 6 DN
changes in XTX output
level seen since launch,
during S/C maneuver with
XTX case temperature of
10°~15.5°C <50°--60°F).
XTX output is now 1.5 dB
above requirement. 6 DN=
0.3dB. Satisfactory
above 15.5°C (60°F).
Day 34 Apparently no mission effect. PFR5015.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
Identification
Time to
Failure Consequences Comments
92. Increase in spin period
(decrease in spin rate)
due to thruster leaks.
Day 160
93. Degradation in thrust levels
for all axial thrusters in the
precession duty cycle mode.
Subsequent
to day 160
Not sufficient to impact mission. Occurred
following a despin maneuver, when slow but
continuous spin rate decrease persisted over
next 7 days, resulting in accumulated decrease
of 0.1% in spin rate. Due to small leak in
despin thruster, but leaks also detected in
precession pair tt2 (thruster 1 and 4) over
the next several weeks.
Apparently due to leaks described in item 892,
but also pressure drops in propellant supply
from such things as restricted filters. Decrease
in isp not significant.
Occurred during Asteroid belt transit.
This is reported separately, but is
apparently related to item #92 above.
Condition noted during Asteroid Belt
transit.
94. ion Engine #1 Turn-on
failure.
95. C-band pre amp SI gain
loss.
96. DACU Itl format anomaly.
Day 146
Day 171
Day 183
Same type failure at item 850.
Mot a flight anomaly; due to inaccuracy in
calibration curve. Subsequent tests verified
proper operation and provided data for
improving calibration curve.
DACU ttl tends to skip even words and repeat odd
words when commanded to dwell oh odd channels,
or, upon turn-on after being off for an extended
period of time. Problem diagnosed as due to Ionic
contamination of address line of DACO Itl Read
Only Memory. Operational procedures now restrict
dwell operations to DACU It2 only.
FAR 706 GFE experiment anomaly.
FAR 317 Ground problem.
FAR 201 Component anomaly, due to improper
cleaning after ammonia cleaning
process. Ammonia residue altered
chip's characteristics, which show
up under certain conditions.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
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97. C-band ECH/PFF receive
coupling.
98. HEX video cross talk.
99. MET audio cross talk .
100. Synthesizer frequency
drift.
101. No output from #2 UHF
xmitter.
Day 64
Day 68
Day 71
Day 82
Day 82
Same as item #31.
Observed during c-band x c/HET 2 and s-band x
HET-1 when both HET's were on 52. Crosstalk
eliminated by using 51. Possibly due to insuf-
ficient selectivity at ground station.
Not a flight anomaly; due to ground equipment.
Original report in error; subsequent tests
showed synthesizer operation to be well within
spec.
Not a flight anomaly; due to incorrect command
sequence (regulator had not been turned on).
FAR 309 Communications problem.
FAR 311 Communications problem.
FAR 312 Ground problem.
FAR 313 Ground problem.
FAR 314 Ground problem.
102. MAO flipper failed to Day 3
complete stroke. Flipper
continued incomplete
strokes until 2-21-74
when cable warming to
-26.1°C (-15°F) allowed
complete stroke.
103. Tracker failed to acquire Day 34
Canopus six times. Low
temperature, prolonged
darkness exposure in roll
control maneuver and gate
calibration accuracy
caused marginal acquisition
conditions.
Work-around procedure used to ensure adequate
power for flips.
PFR5016. MAG=magnetometer.
Use gate G-2 for future acquisitions after
prolonged dark condition.
PFR5017.
EXHIBIT A 7 - (Continued)
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104. Abnormal backlash in
cone slews at 160 deg.
Reference anomaly $105
for corrective action.
105. Scan cone slew sluggish
from 150 to 179 deg.
106. High-gain antenna (HGA)
drive changed from 84
to 85 DN. Low-gain
antenna (LGA) drive
changed from 0 to 9 DN.
Fault in hybrid cavity
or in S-band radiating
cavities. 11 state
changes occurred before
final cure on 3-4-74.
Check design and fabri-
cation cleanliness on
future projects.
Day 42
Day 45
Day 52
Anomaly in Articulation and Pointing System. See PFR5018.
anomaly S105.
Cone limits established. PFR5019.
Cited as "significant problem" - not clear what PFR5020.
this implies.
107. Extra sun pulses from sun
sensor.
108. Small thruster leaks detected
by small changes in s/c spin
rate.
109. False count in thruster #2.
Day 190 Mo mission effect. 16 extra sun pulses occurred
in the span of 2 s/c revolutions. Comet
Kohoutek was too distant to trigger sensor.
Also, asteroids which could have caused this
would have had to be in the large charted
group and near the s/c, which was not the
case.
Day 325 to During encounter period, leaks would start
day 637 after a precession maneuver and continue to
(Encounter) next precession maneuver. Leaks were small
enough that there was no detectable pressure
drop.
Day 607 Counter register for thruster 02 jumped a
count during periapsis. Reason unknown since
ACS was deactivated and no thruster pulse
could have occurred.
Occurred during Asteroid Belt transit.
Possibly the same leaks that developed
earlier (See 893), but this is not
indicated in the available data.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
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110. Stored commands blocked
by real time sequences
which overlap in time.
Time to
Failure Consequences
Sometime Happens occasionally,
between
Orbits 6371
and 7651
Comments
111. Left and right SAD
occasionally have ripple
voltages on their drive
mechanisms.
11/13/73 Insignificant - returned to normal. Attributed to wobble gear wear-in.
112. W3VTR-1 had high headwheel
current during re-wind .
Orbit 6865 Apparently only happened once; established
policy that re-wind could be performed only
when in gnd. station contact.
Attributed to a slip in the count-down
chain delivering 2 phase power to the
headwheel- motor.
113. WBVTR-1 tape unit
pressure drop.
—Orbit 6560 Due to defect in pressure instrumentation
which causes drop in telemetry indication.
Returns to normal.
114. Power Subsystem went
from nBin to standby
chain, rrobably due
to shorted Dickson
1N3092 diode in the
main booster/regulator.
Modify in-flight se-
quences to minimize Power
Subsystem stresses.
Day 67 Switched to block redundancy; would otherwise have
been catastrophic to mission.
PFR5021.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
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115. Multiple pulses from
sun sensor B.
116. Star tracker lock found
to have jumped from Canopus
to Aldebaren.
117. Degradation in star
sensor gain.
Day 365
Day 613
From
day 450
to day
604
Unexplained, single occurrence. Sun sensor
A utilized during remainder of encounter
period.
Tracker had not been in use when this was
detected. Attributed to tracker's susceptibility
to scintillation from the high energy particle
radiation environment and to albedo saturation
recovery effects.
Determined by observations of degenerate
progression in the detection probability of
the star Vega. Subsequent to encounter, Vega
could not be detected. Canopus detection
unaffected.
118. RFI Transponder turn-off
when certain HET cmds
issued.
119. PSA-2 tracks bright
particle.
Day 186
Day 15
Apparently reported due to a misinterpretation.
S/C designed to have RFI transponder turn-off
under these command conditions.
FAR 708 Communications problem.
Polaris Sensor 82 tracking of particles occurs only FAR 104
occasionally and has not yet effected system operation
significantly. Can cause minor disturbance in yaw
axis, but DOC will automatically select the YIRU,
which is always on, and closed loop control will be
maintained.
Possibly due to either 1) sun
reflections getting into the Image
dissecting tube, or, 2) sun
reflections off particles.
120. UHF xmit. 01 High Temp. Day 217 With no uplink signal, temp was 37.8 c. After FAR 318
uplink turn-on, temp increased to 44 c and xmitter was
turned off. Related to starting base plate temp and
was determined that 10-13 c temp rises could be
expected.
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121. HGA dish stopped before
reaching stop position.
Curled HGA cabling wrapped
around the HGA boom.
122. DSS stuck in parking
window when commanded
low-rate playback.
Relative humidity in
DSS may be 57% to 80%,
causing excess catalyst
A in magnetic heads to
come out, reacting with
oxide coating and causing
sticking.
Day 63
Day 68
HGA dish position limits set to avoid problem
and incremental commands used near limits.
Tape recorder anomaly; corrective action was to
park on window and exit with high torque.
PFR5022. HGA=High Gain Antenna.
PFR5023. DSS=Data Storage System.
123. Automatic (non-intended) —Day 60
switching from star sensor
to sun sensor.
124. Star advance feature of ~Day 350
cmd.340 does not work.
125. Sun sensor issued a premature Day 555
sun pulse.
Problem can be overcome by using sun sensor
instead of star sensor.
Problem can be overcome by transmitting
a special command sequence to acquire
Canopus.
Occurred onco at: considerably smaller
sun aspect jiiigle than "double pulse"
anomaly .(F^ o !T/!j) . ?Jo significant conse-
quences resulted.
No further information given.
Attributed to the micro-pulses within
each star pulse; for advance feature
to work, each star must have only^ 1
pulse. This feature allows lock to be
broken on unwanted star in order to
acquire Canopus.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
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126. L-band xmitter (tl. Day 219
intermittent power
output.
127. PSA-2 failed to respond Day 242
to acquisition commands.
128. TWTA Itl RF power low. Day 259
Communication subsystem was configured in
unusual arrangement to serve as a DC load.
Problem attributed to excessive loading on
IF-2 output. Subsequent tests under more
standard conditions reveal no problems.
Subsequent investigation revealed the PSA
wns functioning properly for the cmd.
sequence it had received (i.e., it was
supposed to "lock-out" with that sequence).
Attributed to too much power going into
ground antenna inadvertently, thus blocking
receiver.
FAR 319
FAR 108
FAR 320 Ground problem.
129. High-rate rolI gyro Day 88
oscillations and high
gas use. Roll gyro had
steady 3.62-Hz oscilla-
tion. Extensive tests
and analysis indicate
most likely cause is
exciting seventh S/C
structural mode. Use
solar sailing to minimize
gas use.
130. DSS tape stuck at left Day 98
end of tape. Not in
parking window.
Functional redundancy provided "work-around"-
would otherwise have been catastrophic to mission.
PFR5024.
See anomaly #122. PFR5025.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
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131. Roll wheel anomaly.
132. A2 South Array temp,
sensor failure.
Time to
Failure
Day 392
Day 4 in
Consequences
Instabi l i ty developed in roll axis subsequent
to anticipated porturbat i.ons due to Moon
t rans i t ing the Forth Sensor Roll Scan. Jet
control was necessary to correct instability.
Anomaly at tr ibuted to problem in the pulse
modulator lag amp. and/or its compensation
circui t ry. Special DOC programming for mixed
operations w i t h wheels and roll jet is
planned as corrective action.
Same type- failure as 338. Third of this type.
Mo serious efl'ect reported, but calibration
curves for temp, sensors have been changed.
Comments
FAR 110 Component problem. Apparently
quite a serious problem.
FAR 406 Component problem.
133. Several scientific-
instruments experienced
increased temperatures.
134. Several telemetered
power system parameters
varied slightly during
encounter.
135. Gradual increase in TWT
helix current.
Day 607
Day 325
to day
607
(During
encounter)
Day 607
Occurred at periapsis, and returned to nominal
afterwards. Believed due to Jupiter's infrared
radiation through instrument apertures.
Not si«~Jn i fr"icant, returned to normal after
puriapnis. Possibly due to combined effects
of magnetic, thermal and radiation environments
encountered at that mission phase.
Not sign if leant. Cause; unknown. Mo changes
in power output, cathode current, or ref.
voltages wore observed.
Increases not large enough to cause damage.
No correlation found to link this with
radiation effects on germanium transistors.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
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136. Solar panel tilted to
50 dog. Temperature
over 115°C (.239°F) .
Specification limit
of 115°C <239°F>
applies to cell surface.
Temperature transducer
on opposite side. Peak
cell temperature was
133.3°C (272°F) and
average was 126.1°C (259°F).
Flight acceptance temper-
ature is 120°C (248°F).
Day 119 Apparently no mission effect. PFR5026.
137. A430 high shunt tap
voltage.
Day 310
138. ESA roll scan frozen. Day 336
Shunt tap voltage was 24.5, versus 23.1 to
20.5 for other tups. Evaluation indicated
that no army degradation occurred. Similar
problems have occurred on A419 shunt tap.
Possible cause is chnnge in solar cell
impedance during peak temp, periods. Anomaly
did not impact flight operations.
During offset pointing maneuver, ESA anomaly
caused complicated chain reaction, including
the S/C ".-axis being driven off the Earth and
the sensor nun-avoidance ckt. to operate at
the extreme pitch angles; which existed. The
combination of S/C attitude and sun elevation
which can cause this are rare and predictable,
thus operational policies can prevent future
occurrences of this type anomaly.
FAR 405 Component problem.
FAR 109 Component problem. Apparently
quite a serious problem.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
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139. stellar reference system Day 12
sending jumbled messages
to Earth.
140. Mysterious change in axis of Day 1050
rotation.
Alternate approaches possible.
Change causes s/c to point away from .the
Earth 1/12 eacli clay. Reason for change
unknown, could be slight malfunction or
planetary force not known about. No
d,in<i*jr to s/c. Chocks ruled out the
possibilities of slight loak, interference
from interstellar dust and magnetic field
distortions.
Reported in 3/15/72 Space Daily - no
other information given, and not mentioned
in reports available from ARC.
Reported in June 15, 1975 L.A. Times.
Attributed later to star tracker locking
on wrong star.
141. On panel tilt to 76 cleg. Day 126
current differential
between panels increased.
Probably a partial failure
in section 1 of .-X panel.
Cause unknown.
14',>. Airglow (AG) h igh-vol t-.age Day 127
;>ower turned off in play-
back. Similar problem
occurred in subsystem
tests on both UVS AG units
(Reference prelaunch PFRs
5802 and 5305), but no
occurrence in system tests.
Cited as "significant problem" - not clear
what this implies. Switched to block
redundancy.
Commands will bt: sent during Mercury encounter
to reset UVS AG if off at the time of UVS AG
state change. No significant change in DSS
drive volts or power telemetry.
PFR5027.
PFR5028. Experiment package anomaly.
UVS=Ultraviolec Spectrometer.
EXHIBIT A? (Continued)
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143. Engine catalyst bed Day 128
resistance decrease
after post-trajectory
correction maneuver
(TCM) . Drop after
TCM 1 was 16% and after
TCM 2 was 12*. 1% = 0.09*
in delta velocity.
144. 1IGA boom temperature Day 133
exceeded specification
limit of 90"C (194°F).
Cause is unknown. No
corrective action.
Catalyst bed resistance stabilized after TCM 3. PFR5029. Anomaly in hydrazine propulsion
Flight impulse errors less than \ of specification. system.
Charged to thermal control; apparently no mission
effect.
PFR 5030.
145. Pitch flywheel exhibited a
2 minute halt.
146. WBVTR^l not used because of
high error counts - same
problem as Item 886.
147. The "A" s-band xmitter
power finally dropped
too low (see iter!S S5 & £89) .
l"18a.Pitch CCW motor driver
duty cycle rose~15% .
l-!8b. Duty cycle rose ~26% .
148c. Occurred 6 more times
Orbit 8040
Orbit 8612
Orbit 10,068
From Orbit
9290 to 9340
From Orbit
9887-9910
From Orbits
10,183 to
11,466
Occurred during a sun transient when wheel
was changing directions.
Unit not usable from orbit 8612 to 8845.
Usage will bo limited to tape footages
requiring no more than 5 minutes.
Power output finally declined to 0.14 watts
with noticeable loss in coverage. Operation
switched to "B" unit.
Returned to normal after each occurrence.
Average wheel speed was increased to
obtain a better lubrication condition.
Also experienced high head wheel current -
see item f-112. Note: has not been used since
Orbit 9881.
Postulated that anomaly is connected
with lubrication.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
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149. Spurious commands; over
50 have been executed,
beginning early in the mission
and continuing thru June '75
(date of latest available data).
Dny 20
4/26/73
D;iy 70
C/15/V3
Day 85
6/30/73
Day 101
7/16/73
Day 106
7/21/73
Day 1C.O
9/3/73
Day 172
9/25/73
Day 182
10/5/73
Dny 193
10/6/73
Day lit'}
.10/7/73
Day 304
2/4/74
Day 349
3/21/74
Day 36O
4/1/74
This has never created mission problems since
the falsely executed commands have always
been reversible by ground commands.
Status Chanpos duo to False Commands:
ARC-Rt Bank CCM from 1 to 2 (An exp. pkg.?)
+Y line heatur on (propellant line heater)
ARC - Rt Bank CCM from 1 to 5
ARC - Sector Int<jy. period from 1 to 8
I
-t-Y and -Y lino hoaters on
ARC - Left bank CCM from 1 to 3
ARC - Left; bank CCM from 1 to 5
+ Y and -Y lino heaters on
-Y 1i no heater on
U')U Sequencer enabled
ARC - Rt. bank CCM from 1 and 2
ARC - Left bank CCM from 1 to 3
ARC High voltage limit switched off
This situation has been intensively
studied and the reason for the spurious
commands is still not known. The latest
available report postulates that the
Asteroid/Meteroid detector package may
be causing the problem, but this was
still under study.
Asteroid belt transit.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
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Spurious commands
(Continued)
Timn to
Failure
Day 382
4/23/74
Day 429
6/9/74
Day 440
6/20/74
Day 465
7/15/74
Day 541
9/29/74
Day 606
12/2/74
Day 607
12/3/74
Day 624
12/20/74
Day 679
2/13/75
Consequences Comments
+Y and -y line heaters on
ARC - Sector Integ. period from 1 to 8
ARC - Rt. Bank CCM from 1 to 3
ARC In-flight calibration on
ARC Data source MFM from 4 to 3
Antenna feed offset on, +Y and -y line heaters
heaters on
Numerous changes in scientific Inst. pkgs . Periapsis - these possibly due to Jupiter's
radiation.
+Y line heater on
1) CDU sequencer enabled, 2) +Y and -Y When the sequencer enabled, several
line heaters on, 3) cmd processor changed ordnance functions automatically
Day 702
3/8/75
Day 703
3/9/75
Day 722
3/28/75
Day 723
3/29/75
Day 725
3/31/75
from unit B to A, 4) at least 1 cmd. register
appeared selected for cmd loading 5) HVM
inst. changed from narrow to wideband.
1) +Y and -Y line heaters on, 2) cmd processor
switched from unit B to A.
+Y and -Y line heaters on
-Y line heater on
1) CDU sequencer enabled, 2) +Y and -Y line
heaters on, 3) cmd processor changed from
unit A to B, 4) cmd register 5 selected for
loading, 5) HVM inst. changed from Auto to
Manual ranging.
ARC - Left Bank CCM from 3 to 7
switched from safe to arm. These
functions were for deployments, so
presumably the squibs had all been fired.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
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Spurious commands
(Continued)
Day 729
4/4/75
Day 734
4/9/75
Day 736
4/11/75
Day 737
4/12/75
Day 779
5/24/75
Day 780
5/25/75
Day 799
6/13/75
Day 800
+Y and -Y line heaters on
1) CDU sequencer enabled, 2) cmd processor
changed from unit D to A, and 3) TPP inst.
high voltage on.
1) CDU sequencer enabled, 2) +Y and -Y line
heaters on, 3) cnvi processor changed from
unit B to A, 4) I1VM inst. changed from Auto
to Manual ranging, 5) AMD instrument changed
from narrow to wideband, 6) AMD inst. changed
from high to normal threshold, 7) procession
pairs changed from 1 and 3 to 2 and 4.
1) CDU sequencer enabled twice, 2) +Y and -Y
line heaters on, 3) AMD inst. changed from high
to normal threshold, 4) HVM inst. changed from
auto to manual ranging.
More of the now familiar pattern of line heaters,
CDU sequencer, etc., changes. No "new" types
reported.
1) CDU sequencer on, and 2) -Y line heater on
The first time the IPP inst. has gotten
in on the act.
First time for the precession pairs.
1) CDU sequencer on, and
heater on
2) +Y and -Y line
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
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150. Pitch flywheel stopped From 11,125
for 8 hours. to 11,130
Has been kept close to 0-speed ever since
using pitch control.
Created emergency; large quantity of
control gas used to re-acquire normal
attitude, solar paddles lost sun track, etc.
151. Switched from RMP-B to Orbit 11,257
RMP-A.
152. PCM regulators switched from Orbit 10,910
unit 1 to unit 2 without
command.
153. Data collection subsystem Orbit 12,600
shut-off.
154. NBTR-B became noisy and Orbit 13,015
was turned off.
Precautionary measure after B unit began
showing current variations.
Switched back without commands on orbit 11,035.
Not an anomaly; subsequent spacecraft assumed
this function.
Unit A still available.
Believed due to VHP input signal
transients.
Approaching wear-out of tape.
155. Spacecraft drawing 87 Day 137
watts added power; TV
heaters off. Prime
suspected cause is booster
regulator in the power con-
ditioning equipment. Other
symptoms include: DSS drive
toggles on/off, no response
to DC--13 and 47, X-band
spikos, +4 V TV power dropped
4 Oil, S/C bus temperature
up and RFS frequency change.
156. X-Band Transmitter (XTX) Day 137
output dropped from 81 to
3 DN. Possibly due to loss
of voltage regulation in
chopper transformer circuit.
Carrier can be recovered by
turning XTX power off and
then back on.
Switched to block redundancy, array was able to
support unplanned load, thus preventing mission
failure.
.PFR5031.
Functional redundancy provided "work-around." PFR5032.
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157. No response to DC-43 Day 138
(switch traveling-wave
tube to low power).
Switches probably have
component failure or
circuit degradation.
No more DC-42's or 43 "s
will be sent.
158. Analog engineering data Day 154
from FDS analog/digital
converter 2 went to 127
DN. Appears to be due
to isolated part failure
in FDS.
Functio'nal redundancy provided "work-around. PFR5033.
Switched to block redundancy; probably would
otherwise have caused loss of extended mission.
PFR5034; FDS=Flight Data System.
159. DACU #1 frame sync Day 434
error.
160. DACU #1 frame sync error. Day 452
161. EME-UCLA Magnetometer Day 466
Y-axis failure. .
Word O Frame sync errors occur in frames
11 and 15 permanently, and frames 0,1,2,3,
7,8 and 9 intermittently. Possibly caused
by change in threshhold voltage due to ionic
contamination of ROM (see tt96) ground software
changed to ignore these sync errors.
Frame sync pattern for word 2, frame 15 intermit-
tently reads octal "000" instead of "006." Ho
impact because frame 15 masked due to #159 above.
Attributed to open winding in y-axis offset
coil, possibly caused by temperature extremes
during eclipse season.
FAR 202 Component problem. See "96.
Same anomaly, different symptom.
FAR 203 Component problem.
FAR 710F GFE Experiment problem.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
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162. Canopus tracker lost Day 295
Canopus lock due to
bright particle tracking.
Remain in cruise mode to
minimize oscillations.
163. Canopus tracker lost lock. Day 296
storm of bright particles.
Same analysis and closure
action as anomaly 8162.
164. Lost Canopus acquisition Day 326
due to bright particles.
Maintain roll drift mode
until Mercury encounter
III.
165. Yaw position exceeds limit. Day 379
switch amplifier did not
firo. Exact cause not
determined.
166. Load sharing of battery #6 Orbit 13,300
decreased and batt. over-
charged.
167. s/c clock consistently Throughout
loses time.
168. Solar array current drops. Orbit 13,000
Apparently no mission effect. PFR5038.
Apparently no mission effect. PFR5039.
Apparently no mission effect. PFR5040.
Cited as "significant problem" - not clear what PFR5041.
this implies.
Battery was turned off for a restoration
cycle; will be turned on again after it
has discharged back to normal.
Is periodically reset via ground command.
No effect on mission; current drops
500-600 ma for 1 to 14 minutes early in
the day, then returns to normal.
EXHIBIT A7 - (Continued)
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169- MMW 30 GHz H2 failure.
170. PSA failure.
Day 508
Day 509
The hiyh voltage tripped off each time the
I1V cmd sent. Filament comes on but HV
command shuts down tube. Permanent failure.
Simultaneous bursts of noise noted on both
PSA and ESA outputs, when PSA turned off,
ESA noise cleared up. Spontaneous resets
of PSA adaptive gate step also noted.
(No further details given.)
FAR 711 GFE Experiment problem.
(See item #20.)
FAR 111 Component problem.
171. +X solar panel current , Day 167
increase when tilted
away from Sun. Data
analysis reveals all
responses normal.
172. PSK SES electron multi- Day 259
plier count rate de-
creasing. Normal wearout.
•No corrective action
except turn-off until
Mercury encounter II.
Predictable event.
.173. DSS appears jammed approx- Day 279
imately 21.3 m (70 ft) from
right end of tape. Probably
caused by head-to-tape weld
causing the tape to loop
and jam.
Apparently no mission effect.
Apparently no mission effect.
PFR5035.
PFR5036. Experiment package anomaly.
PSE=Plasma Science Experiment.
Tape recorder anomaly; turned off subsystem. PFR5037. DSS=Data Storage System.
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